The Battle of Mikatagahara — Ieyasu’s Only Great Defeat of His Life, and What Shingen’s Westward Campaign Left Behind

12th month, 22nd day, Genki 3 (January 25, 1573) | Mikatagahara, Fuchi District, Tōtōmi Province (present-day Mikatabara-chō, Chūō Ward, Hamamatsu City, Shizuoka Prefecture)

The Battle of Mikatagahara in Three Lines

• During Takeda Shingen‘s westward campaign, Tokugawa Ieyasu, even with reinforcements from Oda Nobunaga added, was annihilated in only about two hours—the greatest defeat of Ieyasu’s life.
• Anecdotes such as “he soiled himself and excused it as toasted miso” and “he had the grimacing self-portrait (the Shikami portrait) painted after his defeat” have, in recent research, been found to be almost entirely later inventions.
• The victor Shingen died of illness soon after, and Ieyasu held Hamamatsu Castle to the end, making it a turning point toward his later seizure of the realm.

The Mainstream View — A Textbook-Based Explanation

Background — Shingen’s Westward Campaign and the Anti-Nobunaga Encirclement

In the autumn of 1572 (Genki 3), Takeda Shingen of Kai greatly shifted the strategy he had until then devoted to confrontation with Uesugi Kenshin, and began a large-scale invasion of Oda Nobunaga and Tokugawa Ieyasu. This is what is called the “westward campaign.”

At this time, Nobunaga faced the anti-Nobunaga encirclement of Azai Nagamasa and Asakura Yoshikage, and Honganji Kennyo, Ashikaga Yoshiaki, Matsunaga Hisahide, Miyoshi Yoshitsugu, and others had also gathered in opposition to Nobunaga. Furthermore, the feeling of retaliation for the burning of Mt. Hiei (1571) drew in the religious powers, and Nobunaga was driven into a state close to being surrounded on all sides. Shingen, seizing this opportunity, set out westward himself leading a great army. His final objective is said to have been to march on the capital, or else to subdue the Tōkai region and deal a decisive blow to Nobunaga.

The strength Shingen mobilized was about 27,000. This was the maximum mobilization of the Takeda clan, and it was a departure for which Shingen himself had resolved that it was “the final battle.” At the time Shingen was 52, already said to bear an illness called either pulmonary tuberculosis or stomach cancer, and a long campaign had its limits for him.

The Takeda Army’s Invasion Route — The Detachments of Yamagata Masakage and Akiyama Torashige

On the 29th day of the 9th month of 1572 (Genki 3), the Takeda army began its invasion of Mikawa Province with an advance force of 5,000 led by Yamagata Masakage. From that army a detachment of 2,500–5,000 under Akiyama Torashige (Nobutomo) further split off and advanced into eastern Mino, bringing down Iwamura Castle—governed by Nobunaga’s aunt, Lady Otsuya—on the 14th day of the 11th month. Akiyama concluded a bloodless surrender on the condition of marriage with the castle’s mistress, Lady Otsuya. This was a direct intrusion into Oda territory and greatly shook Nobunaga.

Meanwhile Shingen’s main force (about 20,000–22,000) set out from Kōfu on the 3rd day of the 10th month. On the 10th it entered Tōtōmi Province and brought down Tokugawa-side castles such as Tadarai Castle one after another. Castle sieges that would ordinarily take a month it accomplished at an average of three days—a terrifying speed of advance that was, for Ieyasu, like a nightmare.

The Battle of Hitokotozaka — The Prelude to Mikatagahara

On the 13th day of the 10th month, a force Ieyasu had sent out to scout encountered the Takeda army at Hitokotozaka in Tōtōmi (present-day Iwata City) and came to battle. In this preliminary engagement, called the Battle of Hitokotozaka, Ieyasu was saved by the exploits of Honda Tadakatsu and returned to Hamamatsu Castle with his life barely intact. After this battle, a satirical verse is said to have circulated within the Takeda army: “There are two things too good for Ieyasu—the Tang headgear and Honda Heihachi.”

This Battle of Hitokotozaka holds an anecdote that became the origin of the later “Ieyasu soiling legend.” The “Mikawa Go-Fudoki,” compiled in the Edo period, contains a story that when Ieyasu fled back to Hamamatsu Castle, his retainer Ōkubo Tadasuke noticed excrement on the saddle of Ieyasu’s horse and jeered, “Did you soil yourself and come fleeing back?” But as discussed below, this is highly likely a later fabrication.

The Battle of Futamata Castle — Shingen’s “Water-Cutting” Operation

Having won at Hitokotozaka, the Takeda army besieged Futamata Castle, an important base in northern Tōtōmi. Futamata Castle was a strongpoint guarding the north of Hamamatsu Castle; if it were lost, Hamamatsu Castle would be laid bare to invasion from the north.

But Futamata Castle was a strong castle, hard to take. So the operation Shingen devised was the “water-cutting operation.” Futamata Castle had no well, but a contrivance by which water was drawn up by bucket from the nearby Tenryū River. The Takeda army destroyed this water-drawing facility and cut off the water within the castle. The operation succeeded, and on the 19th day of the 12th month Futamata Castle surrendered and opened its gates. The castle commander, Nakane Masateru, withdrew to Hamamatsu Castle.

Shingen placed Yoda Nobushige in this castle as a holding force, and on the 22nd day of the 12th month at last set out toward Hamamatsu Castle. This became the opening of the Battle of Mikatagahara.

Passing By Hamamatsu Castle — Provocation, or Strategic Judgment?

Ieyasu had shown a posture of strengthening the defenses of Hamamatsu Castle and holding it under siege. Reinforcements of about 3,000 also arrived from Nobunaga (Sakuma Nobumori, Hirate Hirohide, Mizuno Nobumoto, and others), and the allied Tokugawa-Oda army had assembled a force of about 11,000. The Takeda army, meanwhile, was about 27,000 (a main force of 20,000 plus the units of Yamagata Masakage, Baba Nobuharu, Oyamada Nobushige, Naitō Masahide, and others). Had he chosen to hold the siege, there was a possibility the strong Hamamatsu Castle could have endured.

Yet Takeda Shingen, on his way toward Hamamatsu Castle, changed course at Mikatagahara and headed in the direction of Lake Hamana (toward Horie Castle). He showed a movement as if he would pass by Hamamatsu Castle and attack into Mikawa. It was a clear act of provocation, like trampling through the back gate of Ieyasu’s residence and passing on.

Ieyasu, overriding the opposition of his senior retainers, changed the siege plan and decided to sortie. The “Mikawa Monogatari” records that Ieyasu spoke as follows. To paraphrase: when a great host is about to trample through the back gate of one’s own residence and pass on, can there be anyone who does not call it to account? A battle is not decided merely by numbers; it is as Heaven wills. It is a fine saying showing his pride as a warrior, but tactically it was an extremely dangerous judgment.

Afternoon of the 22nd of the 12th Month — The Clash on the Mikatagahara Plateau

Ieyasu set out from Hamamatsu Castle leading about 11,000 troops and arrived at the Mikatagahara plateau. He had laid a plan to strike from behind just as the Takeda army was about to descend the Hōda slope. But the Takeda army had already set its guard, and by the time Ieyasu’s army arrived it was waiting in the gyorin (fish-scale) formation, a dense offensive formation.

Ieyasu instantly took the kakuyoku (crane-wing) formation, an encircling formation spread out to the sides. The kakuyoku is originally a formation for encircling an enemy fewer than oneself; it is not a formation a small force takes against a great army. Inferior in numbers and disadvantaged even in formation, Ieyasu’s army was driven into an unfavorable situation from the start of the fighting.

According to the “Mikawa Monogatari,” Shingen had his foot soldiers throw pebbles to provoke, and so opened the fighting. Ieyasu’s army attacked boldly and is said to have, for a time, broken through the Takeda army’s first and second ranks and rushed at Shingen’s headquarters. But, few against many, the Tokugawa army was gradually pushed back.

Ieyasu’s Flight — The Hard Fight the Shinchō Kōki Conveys

The outcome was decided in only about two hours, before sunset. The allied Tokugawa-Oda army was reduced to a state of annihilation, and Ieyasu was forced to flee to Hamamatsu Castle.

The “Shinchō Kōki” conveys the manner of Ieyasu’s retreat. It records that Ieyasu “withdrew along the mountain-side road of Mikatagahara, entirely alone on horseback.” The Takeda army tried to get ahead and cut off his line of retreat, but Ieyasu shot down enemy soldiers one after another from horseback with his bow and galloped through to return to the castle.

In the “Mikawa Monogatari,” it is written that even seeing his allies routed, Ieyasu, untroubled and wishing not to let his pages be killed, rode his horse about, formed a ring, and withdrew. The figure that retreats “untroubled” and “calmly” is the opposite of the later image of “soiling himself in terror.”

In this fighting the Tokugawa army produced about 2,000 dead. Many commanders died—Torii Shirōzaemon, Naruse Tōzō, Honda Tadazane (Tadakatsu’s uncle), Tanaka Yoshitsuna, Nakane Masateru, Aoki Sadaharu, Natsume Yoshinobu (who died standing in for Ieyasu), and Hirate Hirohide, who was a reinforcement from the Oda, among others. The Takeda army’s dead, by contrast, are said to have been only about 200—an overwhelming victory indeed.

The Night Raid at Saigagake — Ieyasu’s Spirit, Striking Back Once

Ieyasu, having fled back to Hamamatsu Castle, that night launched a night raid on the Takeda army to wipe away the humiliation of defeat. Against the Takeda army that had camped near “Saigagake,” a cliff at the southern edge of the Mikatagahara plateau, Ieyasu’s army dispatched a night-raid unit centered on gunners. Confused Takeda soldiers fell down the cliff in the darkness—such is the tradition of the famous “Battle of Saigagake.”

However, it has also been pointed out that the historicity of the Battle of Saigagake may include later embellishment. In later years, the moans of the spirits of Takeda soldiers who had fallen to their deaths from the bottom of Saigagake came to be heard, and Ieyasu invited the monk Sōen to perform a memorial service—this is said to be the origin of the Enshū Dainenbutsu (a regional Buddhist invocation rite).

The Takeda Army’s Course and Shingen’s Death

The victorious Shingen, without taking Hamamatsu Castle by force, headed toward Osakabe (present-day northern Hamamatsu City) and saw out the year. From the first month of 1573 (Genki 4) onward he advanced into Mikawa Province. In the 2nd month of that year he brought down Noda Castle in Mikawa, but here Shingen’s condition worsened.

On the 12th day of the 4th month of 1573 (Genki 4), Shingen died of illness at Komaba in Shinano Province. He was 53. It was only about three months after the overwhelming victory at Mikatagahara. With Shingen’s death the Takeda army hastily withdrew to Kai, and the anti-Nobunaga encirclement decisively collapsed. Shingen’s death was the greatest good fortune for Nobunaga and Ieyasu.

At the Battle of Mikatagahara, the fighting itself was a complete defeat for Ieyasu, but owing to Shingen’s sudden death it became, for Ieyasu, “a defeat in which he suffered no mortal wound.” Had Shingen lived and continued the westward campaign, it is highly likely Ieyasu would have had to abandon Hamamatsu Castle and withdraw to Mikawa, or, in the worst case, would have come to the point of fleeing into Oda territory. The contingency of history saved Ieyasu.

Multiple Theories — Exploring Possibilities from Various Angles

Theory 1: Why Did Ieyasu Make Such a Reckless Sortie?

One of the greatest mysteries of the Battle of Mikatagahara is why Ieyasu abandoned the siege plan and sortied. To challenge the great Takeda army with a small force was, tactically, clearly reckless. Several interpretations have been offered.

The received view: he rose to Shingen’s provocation

The most widely known interpretation is that “Shingen, by passing by Hamamatsu Castle, wounded Ieyasu’s pride, and the young Ieyasu, unable to endure it, sortied.” The “Mikawa Monogatari” too has the description that “Ieyasu was angered at having the back gate of his residence trampled through,” and this has been taken as the basis of the received view.

By this interpretation, Shingen provoked him deliberately, and Ieyasu, swept along by emotion, sortied. The contrast—Ieyasu’s youth at 31, Shingen’s seasoned 52—is easy to grasp as a story, and has often been adopted in dramas and novels.

The new theory: Hirayama Yū’s “Horie Castle defense” theory (the rational-judgment theory)

The historian Hirayama Yū argues, in “A New Theory: Ieyasu and the Battle of Mikatagahara—Reading the Only Great Defeat of His Life” (NHK Publishing Shinsho, 2020), that Ieyasu’s sortie was not mere emotionalism but a rational strategic judgment.

What Hirayama notes is the account of the “Shinchō Kōki.” Having taken Futamata Castle, Shingen “moved around toward Horie Castle and operated there”—Shingen, after passing by Hamamatsu Castle, was trying to take Horie Castle (present-day western Hamamatsu City). Horie Castle was a strategic site from which one could control the water transport of Lake Hamana. If it were taken, the supply route into Hamamatsu Castle would be cut off, and the siege itself would become difficult.

In other words, it is highly likely that Ieyasu’s options were not “siege” or “sortie,” but only “an active measure to secure the supply route.” That he intercepted the Takeda army on the Mikatagahara plateau was for the purpose of blocking the Takeda army’s advance toward Horie Castle—such is Hirayama’s interpretation.

By this theory, Ieyasu did not sortie out of “reckless emotionalism,” but responded to the field battle out of “an unavoidable strategic judgment.” Ieyasu’s sortie was highly likely based not so much on a warrior’s pride as on the cool calculation of a manager of his domain.

The plan to strike from behind at the descent of the Hōda slope

Another tactical basis cited for Ieyasu’s sortie is the plan to “strike from behind the Takeda army as it descended the Hōda slope.” The moment the Takeda army descended the slope from the Mikatagahara plateau, its column would stretch out lengthwise and its order break. To aim at that moment offered the possibility that even a small force could smash a great army—such was Ieyasu’s calculation.

But Shingen had seen through this plan. The Takeda army did not in fact descend the slope, but arrayed its formation on the plateau and met Ieyasu’s army. Ieyasu’s plan was completely outdone by Shingen’s seasoned skill.

The credibility of the “Mikawa Monogatari”

The “Mikawa Monogatari” is a history of the Tokugawa house written by Ōkubo Tadataka; he himself did not take part, but his elder brother did, giving it a character close to a contemporary source. Unlike the war chronicles of the early modern period, it records not that “the war council was held in Hamamatsu Castle” but that “it was held after Ieyasu had sortied from Hamamatsu Castle.” In other words, the decision to sortie was highly likely made not in discussion within Hamamatsu Castle but during the march.

This suggests that Ieyasu made not “a rational judgment after exhausting discussion,” but “an immediate judgment according to the situation.” Seeing the Takeda army’s course, he judged it necessary to block the advance toward Horie Castle—such a field judgment is highly likely.

In conclusion, the current leading theory is that Ieyasu’s sortie was not “rising recklessly to a provocation” but “a rational judgment for the defense of Horie Castle.” As a result he suffered a great defeat, but the judgment itself can be appraised as rational for a Sengoku daimyō.

Theory 2: The “Shikami Portrait” Is Unrelated to Mikatagahara — A Modern Invention

What is most bound up with the Battle of Mikatagahara is the portrait of Tokugawa Ieyasu called the “Shikami portrait” (the grimacing portrait). Its formal name is “Portrait of Tokugawa Ieyasu at the Battle of Mikatagahara.” The received view was that Ieyasu, having been greatly defeated at Mikatagahara, had it painted by an artist for self-admonition and kept it at his side all his life. But in recent years this received view is being completely overturned.

Hara Fumihiko’s epoch-making paper (2016)

Hara Fumihiko, a curator at the Tokugawa Art Museum, traced in detail, in a lecture at that museum in August 2015 and in his 2016 paper “The Riddle of the Portrait of Tokugawa Ieyasu at the Battle of Mikatagahara” (“Kinshachi Sōsho,” vol. 43), how the Shikami portrait came to be linked with Mikatagahara. Its conclusion was shocking.

• In the Edo-period records of the Tokugawa Art Museum, no anecdote calling this picture “an admonition of the Battle of Mikatagahara” exists.
• In “Kokka,” published in 1910 (Meiji 43), this picture was explained as “an image of Ieyasu at the Battle of Nagashino.”
• In January 1936 (Shōwa 11), at an exhibition of the Tokugawa Art Museum, it was for the first time linked with “the Battle of Mikatagahara.”
• The occasion was that the then director, Tokugawa Yoshichika, the 19th head of the Owari Tokugawa house, said in a dialogue in a local newspaper that “Yoshinao had Kanō Tan’yū paint it so as not to forget Ieyasu’s hardships.”
• In the 1972 (Shōwa 47) “Catalogue of Masterpieces of the Tokugawa Art Museum,” it was stated that “Ieyasu himself had it painted for self-admonition,” and the formal name “Portrait of Tokugawa Ieyasu at the Battle of Mikatagahara” became established.

In other words, the image of “the Shikami portrait = Ieyasu’s self-portrait after the defeat at Mikatagahara” is no more than something that became established only after 1972. Until then, there was even the possibility that it was regarded as “Ieyasu at Nagashino.”

The picture itself is a work of the mid-Edo period

Hara’s research further pointed out the possibility that the production of the picture itself comes down to the mid-Edo period (late 17th to 18th century). Judging from its painting technique, coloring, and form, it is hard to think it a work of just after the Battle of Mikatagahara (1573). There are contradictions in the dress as well:

• The figure—in an eboshi cap, armor hitatare, and a single forearm guard—is the armament of a high-ranking warrior of the Heian and Kamakura periods, not seen in the Genki–Tenshō era.
• Although Mikatagahara was a winter battle, the figure is barefoot in straw sandals. That he wears no leather tabi is unnatural.
• The thin forearm guard is worn over the sleeve of the armor hitatare, but this is in reality impossible because the fabric would be too bulky.

These contradictions show that the picture cannot be “a realistic portrait of Ieyasu just after the Battle of Mikatagahara.”

Matsushima Hitoshi’s “deification theory”

The art historian Matsushima Hitoshi (professor at the Mt. Fuji World Heritage Centre, Shizuoka) makes an important observation from a different angle. The posture of the Shikami portrait—”one hand against the cheek, one leg crossed”—is extremely close to the “half-lotus pensive” (hanka shiyui) pose of Buddhist images. This is a posture widely seen in Buddhist images such as Maitreya.

Matsushima points out the possibility that the Shikami portrait was painted as a Buddhist-style portrait for worship of “Ieyasu, deified as Tōshō Daigongen.” The “grimace” of Ieyasu’s expression too can be interpreted not as the haggardness of defeat but as the expression of “Buddhist wrath” (the wrathful aspect) often seen in Buddhist painting.

In other words, Matsushima’s view is that the Shikami portrait was not painted for self-admonition over a defeat, but was a religious painting for deifying and worshiping Ieyasu.

So why did this anecdote spread?

Watanabe Daimon too, in a 2025 Yahoo! News article, declares the Mikatagahara-relatedness of the Shikami portrait to be “something shaped by later interpretation and forced association.” Why did this “beautiful didactic tale” spread so far? It is because it is a story with which we today sympathize—the image of Ieyasu, who learned from defeat and took the realm.

“Sincerely reflecting on failure leads to the next success”—this lesson has been repeatedly cited in the business books and self-help books of postwar Japan and has formed the core of the image of Ieyasu. Alongside “I’ll wait until it cries, the cuckoo,” the Shikami portrait became a symbol of the image of “Ieyasu the patient.”

But as historical fact, the link between the Shikami portrait and the Battle of Mikatagahara is no more than a modern invention. Even for the stone statue of the “Shikami portrait” standing in Okazaki Park in Okazaki City (erected in 2007), it is now officially explained that the basis of this anecdote was created in modern times. To savor the appeal of the Shikami portrait while understanding the boundary between history and story is the attitude required of us today.

Theory 3: Is the “Ieyasu Soiling” Legend Historical Fact?

The most widely known anecdote of the Battle of Mikatagahara is the episode that “Ieyasu, in his terror, soiled himself, and when called to account by a retainer, excused it as ‘this is toasted miso.'” Repeatedly depicted in NHK historical dramas and novels, it is beloved as a story symbolizing Ieyasu’s humanity. But the historicity of this anecdote too is, in recent years, being completely denied.

No mention in the “Shinchō Kōki” or “Mikawa Monogatari”

The most reliable contemporary sources dealing with the Battle of Mikatagahara—the “Shinchō Kōki” and “Mikawa Monogatari”—contain no mention whatsoever of Ieyasu’s soiling episode. Rather, as noted above, the “Shinchō Kōki” depicts Ieyasu’s hard fighting, “galloping through while shooting down enemies from horseback with his bow,” and the “Mikawa Monogatari” records his calm figure retreating “untroubled.”

In particular, Ōkubo Tadataka, the author of the “Mikawa Monogatari,” was the uncle of Ōkubo Tadachika, who is said to be the source of the tradition. Had there really been an incident in which Tadachika jeered at Ieyasu as a “coward,” it ought to have been recorded in detail precisely in the “Mikawa Monogatari,” which writes sharply of the Tokugawa house’s history. That it is not there is strong evidence that the soiling legend itself is a later invention.

The “Hitokotozaka” account in the “Mikawa Go-Fudoki”

The oldest source of the soiling legend is the “Mikawa Go-Fudoki,” of unknown authorship, written in the mid-17th century in the Edo period. To paraphrase its content: Ōkubo Tadachika raised his voice and jeered toward the man leading Ieyasu’s horse, telling him to look well at the saddle, for there would be excrement on it—that Ieyasu had soiled himself.

— Source: “Mikawa Go-Fudoki,” vol. 13

What deserves attention is that this is written as a story after the Battle of Hitokotozaka, not Mikatagahara. And it is told in a context that, in contrast with the praise of the retainer Honda Tadakatsu as “too good for Ieyasu,” jeers at Ieyasu’s disgraceful flight.

Furthermore, the “Mikawa Go-Fudoki” is a book with a theory of being a forgery, and its value as a source is extremely low. In the “Kaisei Mikawa Go-Fudoki” (completed in 1837, Tenpō 8), compiled by order of the 11th Edo shogun Tokugawa Ienari, the compiler Narushima Motonao attempted to delete the description including this anecdote, on the grounds that “Ieyasu did not sortie that day; it is an impossible story” (in fact it was left in).

In other words, even the official historical verification of the Tokugawa shogunate treated the soiling legend negatively.

Why was it linked with “Mikatagahara”? — The influence of Yamaoka Sōhachi

Then why did this anecdote spread as “a story of the Battle of Mikatagahara”? The one who made the decisive turning point was the Shōwa-era historical novelist Yamaoka Sōhachi, with his long novel “Tokugawa Ieyasu” (from the 1950s). That work became a mega-bestseller exceeding 17 million copies in total and exerted an enormous influence on the image of Ieyasu.

Yamaoka Sōhachi incorporated the soiling episode, originally a story of Hitokotozaka, into the story of the Battle of Mikatagahara. This was followed by NHK historical dramas and other novels, and the image of “Ieyasu soiling himself at Mikatagahara” became established. In other words, the soiling legend that is now widespread is a modern invention created by postwar historical fiction.

Watanabe Daimon’s view

The historian Watanabe Daimon, in a 2025 Yahoo! News article, organizes this problem clearly. To paraphrase: the story that Ieyasu soiled himself is a story of the Battle of Hitokotozaka, but that itself was an error; only the anecdote spread, and at some point it spread as an episode of the Battle of Mikatagahara, where Ieyasu suffered the greatest defeat of his life.

In other words, through a double process of invention—(1) the Hitokotozaka soiling story itself being an Edo-period invention derived from a forgery, and (2) the linkage with Mikatagahara being a further embellishment by postwar fiction—the present “Mikatagahara soiling legend” was formed.

The background of the “useless Ieyasu” tradition

Another point of interest is that many traditions of “Ieyasu losing and fleeing” remain in the Enshū region (western Shizuoka Prefecture). Stories such as “Hachiemon’s buckwheat noodles” and “the monk of Eisen-ji,” in which Ieyasu was helped by the local people and escaped, are handed down in various places.

By researchers’ analysis, this is thought to be the resistance of the populace to the harshness of Ieyasu’s rule of Enshū, handed down as stories of “a hero who loses and flees about.” The local people, unable to voice their dissatisfaction with Ieyasu, vented it by adding embellishments—”he lost here too,” “he fled over there too.” The soiling legend too is highly likely in the lineage of such “useless Ieyasu” traditions. In later years, after Ieyasu became ruler of the realm, the opposite structure also worked, in which the local people raised their own sense of worth by saying “it was we who helped that great Lord Ieyasu.”

Theory 4: Where Was the True Site of the Old Battlefield?

Regarding the battlefield of the Battle of Mikatagahara, a surprising fact is known: “the exact location of the main battlefield has still not been identified.”

At present, a “Mikatagahara Old Battlefield Monument” stands within the grounds of the Mikatagahara Cemetery (Nearai-chō, Chūō Ward, Hamamatsu City), but this was erected in 1984 (Shōwa 59) by volunteers of the “Mikatagahara History and Culture Preservation Society” and is not based on historical examination. Identification beyond the broad framework of “the Mikatagahara plateau” is difficult both in terms of sources and of archaeology—such is the present state.

The four leading theories Hirayama Yū organizes

According to the historian Hirayama Yū, there are at present mainly four leading theories:

• The Azukimochi theory: the Azukimochi area of Chūō Ward, Hamamatsu City. A place name where traditions remain that, while fleeing, Ieyasu ate azuki-bean rice cake (azukimochi) at a teahouse, or fled without paying.
• The Nearai (top of the Hōda slope) theory: the area around the present Mikatagahara Cemetery. On the plateau overlooking the Hōda slope, it accords with the point from which Ieyasu was to strike the Takeda army from behind.
• The Ōshibahara theory: the Ōshibahara district of the Mikatagahara plateau. A tradition that the place name “Ōshiba” shows the trace of the fighting.
• The Ōya theory: the Ōya district of northern Hamamatsu City. A position that better accords with the Takeda army’s course.

Because there are few sources directly recording the main battlefield, and because some of the related historic sites have been relocated or have disappeared through development, verification is difficult and no conclusion has been reached.

The change in the notation “Mikatagahara”

There is an interesting background even to the name of the battlefield itself. Mikatagahara was anciently called “Migatahara.” It is handed down that this was because it was a plateau in “the shape of a winnowing basket (mi),” or because Mt. Fuji as seen from that plateau is “in the shape of a winnowing basket.”

Afterward, once the land became the common holding (commons) of three villages (Waji, Hōda, and Miyakoda), it is handed down that the present notation “Mikatagahara” (the field of three directions/sides) came about. In other words, the place name in the Sengoku period was, strictly speaking, highly likely “Migatahara.”

The Takeda army’s course

As for the Takeda army’s course, detailed verification has advanced in modern research. In popular books on the Battle of Mikatagahara the description “advancing south along the Akiha Road” is often seen, but this is a designation from the Edo period onward. At the time it was called the “Futamata Road.”

Having set out from Futamata Castle, the Takeda army went south along the Futamata Road, climbed onto the Mikatagahara plateau, and halted at Oiwake. Seen from Hamamatsu Castle, it was a situation in which the Takeda army was passing right before one’s eyes, from east to west. This connected to Ieyasu’s sense of “having the back gate of his residence trampled through.”

The identification of the main battlefield awaits future archaeological investigation, but on the broad battlefield of the Mikatagahara plateau, many remains have been lost to later development. The Battle of Mikatagahara is a battle that bears the double difficulty of the scarcity of sources and the difficulty of geographic identification.

Theory 5: Is the “Empty-Castle Ruse” (Opening the Castle Gates) Historical Fact?

Another famous anecdote accompanying the Battle of Mikatagahara is Ieyasu’s “empty-castle ruse” (opening the castle gates). Ieyasu, having fled back to Hamamatsu Castle, opened the castle gates, had watch-fires lit, and waited for the Takeda army. The Takeda army, wary of a stratagem, gave up attacking the castle and withdrew—such is the story.

This is an ingenious anecdote reminiscent of Zhuge Liang’s “empty-fort stratagem” in the Chinese Three Kingdoms. As a famous scene showing Ieyasu’s calm and cunning, it is often depicted in dramas and novels.

No mention in contemporary sources

But this empty-castle ruse anecdote too has no mention in the reliable contemporary sources “Shinchō Kōki” and “Mikawa Monogatari.” The “Shinchō Kōki” records only that, after Ieyasu returned to Hamamatsu Castle, he “strengthened the defenses,” and there is no mention whatsoever of opening the castle gates.

By historians’ indications, this empty-castle ruse anecdote is extremely likely a later invention. The explanation that “the Takeda army, wary of a stratagem, did not attack the castle” is thought to have been created as a story by which later people rationally explained “why Ieyasu was not killed.”

The true reason the Takeda army did not attack Hamamatsu Castle

Then why did the Takeda army not attack Hamamatsu Castle? Several realistic reasons can be considered for this:

• Shingen’s strategic judgment: to attack a strong castle like Hamamatsu would cost much time and attrition. Shingen prioritized the final objective of the westward campaign (the march on the capital, or the subjugation of Mikawa) and chose to “pass by” Hamamatsu Castle.
• Shingen’s health problem: Shingen, already bearing a serious illness, highly likely wished to avoid a long campaign.
• The sufficiency of the results: Shingen, having dealt Ieyasu’s army a devastating blow at Mikatagahara, had already achieved his strategic objective (the weakening of Ieyasu).
• The limits of a winter campaign: there was no margin to drag out a castle siege in the year-end period of late 12th month.

It is reasonable to think that these realistic factors made Shingen choose to “pass by Hamamatsu Castle.” Rather than the romantic interpretation of “Ieyasu’s cunning,” it can be explained by the military and strategic rationality of the Sengoku period.

The meaning of Ieyasu’s “untroubled” state

The state of Ieyasu after the defeat that the “Mikawa Monogatari” conveys is interesting. It records that Ieyasu “entered the castle without any trouble”—that he entered the castle calmly. Rather than a flashy production like the empty-castle ruse, that figure keeping his composure even right after defeat can be said to have been Ieyasu’s true mettle.

Rather, one can read that Ieyasu’s composure was so splendid that it required no cunning anecdote like the empty-castle ruse. A story adds embellishment when the historical fact itself is poor in “narrative high points.” Ieyasu’s true strength may have lain precisely in the calm that creates no spectacle.

Theory 6: Were the “Fish-Scale vs. Crane-Wing” Formations Real?

What always comes up in speaking of the Battle of Mikatagahara is the contrast of formations—”the Takeda army’s fish-scale, the Tokugawa army’s crane-wing.” The “Mikawa Monogatari” records this formation contrast, and it has been repeatedly cited in later war-history research as well. But around this formation too, reexamination has advanced in recent years.

The account of the “Mikawa Monogatari”

The “Mikawa Monogatari” records that the Takeda’s 30,000-plus “fish-scale” and the Tokugawa’s 8,000 “crane-wing” contended. According to the literature of the period, the fish-scale of the time was a dense formation, suited to defense and to single-point breakthrough. The crane-wing was not V-shaped but closer to a splayed “eight”-character shape, and was for encircling an enemy fewer than oneself.

The puzzle of Ieyasu’s choice of formation

Here a question arises. The crane-wing is originally a formation for encircling an enemy fewer than oneself. It is not a formation a small force takes against a great army. With Ieyasu at about 10,000 and the Takeda at about 27,000, for Ieyasu to take the crane-wing departs from the ABCs of tactics. On this there are several theories:

(1) The theory of Ieyasu’s tactical blunder

The simple interpretation that Ieyasu misjudged the situation and chose an inappropriate formation. On the ground, where he had to arrange a formation in a short time, it is highly likely there was no margin to choose the optimal tactic.

(2) The crane-wing for active offense theory

The interpretation that Ieyasu had resolved on decisive battle from the start, and tried, even with a small force, to actively encircle the Takeda army. This accords with Ieyasu’s plan to “strike from behind at the descent of the Hōda slope.” The scenario is that he tried to encircle, with a laterally spread formation, the moment the Takeda army descended the slope, but because Shingen did not descend the slope, he shifted to a frontal decisive battle in the unfavorable configuration.

(3) The historical-embellishment theory

To begin with, whether precise formations could be arranged in a Sengoku-period field battle is doubted in recent research. Orderly formations such as “fish-scale” and “crane-wing” are strongly influenced by the idealization of later military-science texts, and the actual battlefield was highly likely more chaotic. The account of the “Mikawa Monogatari” too may be, rather than a direct reflection of the reality of the Sengoku period, an organization based on the military-science knowledge of the early early-modern period.

The contrast with the “Shinchō Kōki”

What is interesting is that the “Shinchō Kōki” has almost no description of formations. It is the Tokugawa-side sources, centered on the “Mikawa Monogatari,” that emphasize the formation contrast. The narrative configuration of “fish-scale vs. crane-wing” can be said to have a large aspect of having been emphasized within the Tokugawa historical view.

In conclusion, regarding the formations of the Battle of Mikatagahara, it is reasonable to understand that (1) there was some formation contrast, (2) but the precise scheme of “fish-scale vs. crane-wing” is highly likely a later organization, and (3) the reality of the fighting was decided by the difference in numbers and the terrain conditions rather than by formations. The dramatic configuration of “the impregnable fish-scale vs. the disadvantaged crane-wing” should be distinguished from historical fact itself, while being made use of as a conceptual diagram helpful for understanding Sengoku battles.

Viewed Strategically

Viewing the Battle of Mikatagahara from the standpoint of strategy, it emerges as a singular battle in which two axes—the “grand design” and “the life and death of an individual”—intersected in the Sengoku period.

First, the design of Shingen’s westward campaign. The 27,000 Shingen mobilized was the maximum mobilization of the Takeda clan. This was the expression of his resolve that it was “the final battle.” Shingen was then 52, already bearing a serious illness, and aware of the limits of a long campaign. On that basis, seizing the opportunity of the anti-Nobunaga encirclement, he decided on an all-out departure—this is the westward campaign.

What was Shingen’s final objective? There are various theories even among researchers, but possibilities are discussed: (1) to march on the capital and relieve Shogun Ashikaga Yoshiaki; (2) to subdue the Tōkai region and destroy Nobunaga’s economic base; (3) to subjugate Ieyasu and then divide the realm in two between the great Oda and Takeda powers. In any case, Shingen’s westward campaign was a turning point at which the Takeda clan was transforming from a Sengoku daimyō into “a power that aimed at the realm.” The overwhelming victory at Mikatagahara holds historical significance as its first step. Had Shingen been healthy and able to continue the westward campaign, the end of the Sengoku period would have taken on a greatly different form.

Second, the rationality of Ieyasu’s judgment to sortie. Ieyasu’s sortie, until now regarded as “reckless emotionalism,” has in recent research by Hirayama Yū and others been reappraised as “a rational strategic judgment.” To defend Horie Castle, it was necessary to block the Takeda army’s course. Under a siege strategy, the water transport of Lake Hamana would be seized, and in the end Hamamatsu Castle too would be isolated. The sortie was “an unavoidable active measure.”

As a result he suffered a great defeat, but the judgment itself was rational for a Sengoku daimyō. Ieyasu did not sortie swept along by emotion, but chose the field battle on the basis of strategic rationality. On this point, the judgment of the 31-year-old Ieyasu was by no means immature.

Third, the contingency of history that was Shingen’s sudden death. Four months after Mikatagahara, on the 12th day of the 4th month of 1573 (Genki 4), Shingen died of illness at Komaba in Shinano Province. He was 53. This was, for Ieyasu and Nobunaga, literally “a deliverance from Heaven.”

Had Shingen lived, the westward campaign would surely have continued. The Takeda army that advanced into Mikawa would highly likely have brought down Okazaki Castle and Yoshida Castle and completely subdued Ieyasu’s home base. Ieyasu would have abandoned Hamamatsu and withdrawn to Mikawa, or, in the worst case, come to the point of fleeing into Nobunaga’s territory. The Battle of Mikatagahara was the greatest trial of Ieyasu’s life and, at the same time, met the miraculous ending of “a defeat in which he suffered no mortal wound,” owing to Shingen’s sudden death.

The subsequent fate of the Takeda clan, too, was not unrelated to Mikatagahara. The Takeda clan, having lost Shingen, was succeeded by the young Takeda Katsuyori, but the confusion at the time of the succession and the conflict with his father Shingen’s dying injunctions connected to the later great defeat at the Battle of Nagashino (1575) and the destruction of the Takeda clan in 1582. Mikatagahara was the height of the Takeda clan and, at the same time, a turning point toward its decline.

Fourth, the problem of the myth surrounding the “lesson Ieyasu learned.” In the received view, it is said that, taking the defeat at Mikatagahara as a turning point, Ieyasu acquired “a cool and composed way of fighting.” The story that he kept the “Shikami portrait” at his side and admonished his own conceit is also part of this myth.

But looking at Ieyasu’s behavior after Mikatagahara, he did not necessarily become “cautious through and through.” Right after the Honnō-ji Incident of 1582 he escaped from Mikawa via the Iga crossing and immediately set about subduing the former Takeda lands. At the Battle of Komaki and Nagakute in 1584 he challenged Hideyoshi, then the strongest, head-on. At Sekigahara in 1600 he wagered on a battle whose prospects were uncertain. At the Siege of Osaka in 1614–15 too he took an active strategy to destroy the Toyotomi house at a stroke.

Even after Mikatagahara, Ieyasu was a warrior who would mount a bold gamble when necessary. The image of “I’ll wait until it cries” and “Ieyasu the patient” is an image of Ieyasu deified from the Edo period onward, and differs from the reality. What Ieyasu learned from Mikatagahara may have been not “to avoid adventure” but “to prepare thoroughly when one does adventure.”

Fifth, the meaning of Shingen’s “passing by” tactic. Shingen’s act of passing by Hamamatsu Castle was not mere provocation. Shingen’s strategic objective was “to destroy Ieyasu’s domain and weaken Nobunaga’s ally,” and the occupation of Hamamatsu Castle itself was no more than a secondary objective. If he brought down Horie Castle and seized the water transport of Lake Hamana, Hamamatsu Castle would wither of itself—such was Shingen’s design.

It was precisely because Ieyasu saw through this design that he had no choice but to sortie. The siege strategy was an option that “could hold the castle in the short term but lose the domain in the medium term,” an outcome unacceptable to Ieyasu. The Battle of Mikatagahara can be said to have been the very acme of the strategic reading-of-each-other of the Sengoku period—”Ieyasu, forced into a decisive battle, vs. Shingen, cornering him strategically.”

Finally, to organize the historical positioning of the Battle of Mikatagahara: this battle holds several historical meanings—(1) the greatest military result of Shingen’s life, (2) the only great defeat of Ieyasu’s life, (3) the turning point of the apex and collapse of the anti-Nobunaga encirclement, (4) the boundary between the height and the decline of the Takeda clan. It is rare for a single field battle of so short a duration to hold such multilayered historical significance.

And owing to Shingen’s sudden death, this great defeat did not become a mortal wound for Ieyasu. History sometimes grants a miraculous turn of fortune to the side of the loser as well as to the side of the victor. The Battle of Mikatagahara will surely continue to draw attention in the study of the Sengoku period as a typical example of that.

Famous Words and Sayings of This Battle

“When a great host is about to trample through the back gate of one’s own residence and pass on, can there be anyone who does not call it to account?”

(traditionally Tokugawa Ieyasu, at the moment of deciding to sortie)

The words the “Mikawa Monogatari” conveys, spoken when Ieyasu abandoned the siege plan and resolved to sortie. When the Takeda army tried to pass by Hamamatsu Castle and head toward Mikawa, Ieyasu is said to have spoken thus and overridden the opposition of his senior retainers. He continued, “A battle is not decided merely by numbers; it is as Heaven wills.” It is a fine saying showing his pride and resolve as a warrior, but in recent research the possibility has been pointed out that it was not emotionalism but a strategic judgment for the defense of Horie Castle.

— Ōkubo Tadataka, “Mikawa Monogatari”

“Ieyasu, untroubled, wishing not to let his pages be killed…”

A passage of the “Mikawa Monogatari” conveying Ieyasu’s state at the time of his flight. It says that Ieyasu, not falling into confusion, rode his horse about and formed a ring to withdraw, in order to protect his pages. A cool and composed image of a commander is depicted, the very opposite of the later image of “soiling himself in terror.” This account of the “Mikawa Monogatari,” close to a contemporary source, is regarded as precious testimony conveying Ieyasu’s true figure at the time of defeat.

— Ōkubo Tadataka, “Mikawa Monogatari”

“There are two things too good for Ieyasu—the Tang headgear and Honda Heihachi.”

A satirical graffito said to have been written by the Takeda retainer Kosugi Sakon in response to Honda Tadakatsu’s hard fighting in the rear guard at the Battle of Hitokotozaka, the preliminary engagement of the Battle of Mikatagahara. The “Tang headgear” was a helmet ornament made of yak hair, then in fashion within the Tokugawa house. As words by which even the Takeda house praised the valor of Honda Tadakatsu, it was handed down to later ages. At the main Battle of Mikatagahara too, Tadakatsu fought hard and became one of those who brought Ieyasu back alive to Hamamatsu Castle.

— A satirical verse by the Takeda retainer Kosugi Sakon (tradition)

Anecdotes and Episodes of the Battle of Mikatagahara

Takeda Shingen’s “Terrifying Speed of Advance”

The Takeda army’s invasion of Tōtōmi was a speed that overturned the common sense of the Sengoku period. Branch-castle sieges that would ordinarily take a month, the Takeda army brought down at an average of three days. This was the fruit of Shingen’s careful preliminary investigation, the Takeda army’s high combat ability, and the inside-collusion maneuvering of the local kokujin.

For Ieyasu it was a nightmarish speed of advance, and the Tokugawa domain’s defense strategy completely collapsed. Because Yamagata Masakage’s force had invaded Mikawa, the number Ieyasu could actually mobilize for the defense of Tōtōmi Province was no more than about 8,000. He could gather only half of the Tokugawa clan’s mobilization strength, said to be “at most 15,000.”

Natsume Yoshinobu’s Standing In — The Loyal Retainer Who Saved Ieyasu

In the flight from Mikatagahara, the one who saved Ieyasu was the standing-in of his retainer Natsume Yoshinobu. Yoshinobu was the caretaker of Hamamatsu Castle, but on learning of Ieyasu’s flight he hurried to the scene, gave Ieyasu his own horse and helmet, and told him, “Wear these and escape to Hamamatsu Castle.” Then, raising Ieyasu’s battle standard, he charged the Takeda army, standing in for Ieyasu, and died in battle. He was 55.

This anecdote is widely known as a story symbolizing the strength of the Tokugawa retainer band’s solidarity. Ieyasu never forgot this loyalty all his life, and in later years treated the Natsume house generously. The Mikawa retainer band’s “loyalty unto death to the lord” was Ieyasu’s greatest asset and became the foundation of his later seizure of the realm.

Honda Tadakatsu’s Furious Valor — The Fierce General Who Supported Ieyasu

The one who showed the greatest activity through the Battle of Mikatagahara and the preliminary Battle of Hitokotozaka was Honda Tadakatsu. At Hitokotozaka he served as the rear guard and checked the Takeda army’s pursuit, and at the main Battle of Mikatagahara too he guarded the flank of Ieyasu’s headquarters and fought hard.

“There are two things too good for Ieyasu—the Tang headgear and Honda Heihachi”—the valor of Tadakatsu, acknowledged even by the enemy commander, came, with the Battle of Mikatagahara as its occasion, to resound throughout the Sengoku realm. At the later Battle of Nagashino too Tadakatsu was active, and he built up the legend that he was unwounded in the 57 battles of his life.

The Death of Hirate Hirohide — The Tragedy of the Oda Reinforcements

Among the commanders who died at the Battle of Mikatagahara was Hirate Hirohide, who had taken part as a reinforcement from the Oda house. Hirohide was a young commander, the grandson of Nobunaga’s tutor Hirate Masahide, and a presence whose future was promising even within the Oda house.

Nobunaga dispatched Sakuma Nobumori and Hirate Hirohide as reinforcements, but it is handed down that Nobumori was cold and did not fight actively, and only Hirohide fought hard and died. After the battle, Nobunaga strongly reproached Nobumori for “abandoning Hirate.” There is also a theory that this became a remote cause of the later expulsion of Sakuma Nobumori in 1580 (Tenshō 8).

The Night Raid at Saigagake — Ieyasu’s Spirit, Striking Back Once

On the night of the defeat, Ieyasu launched a night raid on the Takeda army bivouacked at Saigagake. A small unit centered on gunners, taking advantage of the dark, made gunfire ring out in the Takeda camp. There is a tradition that confused Takeda soldiers fell down the cliff in the darkness.

After the Battle of Saigagake, the moans of the spirits of the Takeda soldiers came to be heard from the bottom of Saigagake, and people feared them. Ieyasu invited the monk Sōen and held a memorial service to console the spirits of the Takeda soldiers, and thereafter the moans were no longer heard. This memorial service is said to be the origin of the Enshū Dainenbutsu.

Although the scale of the fighting itself and its results include later embellishment, it is a fact that Ieyasu, even on the night of defeat, did not give up and held the spirit to strike back once at the Takeda army. This was the true mettle of Ieyasu, who at Mikatagahara “was defeated but not destroyed.”

“Hachiemon’s Buckwheat Noodles” — Ieyasu Saved by the Local People

After the Battle of Mikatagahara, a village headman named Hachiemon, mowing grass, caught sight of the fleeing Ieyasu and hid him with the cut grass. He then took him to his house and fed him buckwheat noodles. Having recovered his strength, Ieyasu was able to return safely to Hamamatsu Castle. Later, Hachiemon is said to have received a sword from Ieyasu as a reward.

As a similar anecdote, there is also one in which the abbot of Eisen-ji shaved the head of the fleeing Ieyasu, making him completely bald, and had him calmly read sutras even when the Takeda army came. The Takeda army, thinking there was only a monk at the temple, withdrew its soldiers.

These “Ieyasu-rescue traditions” remaining in the Enshū region are thought to reflect the twist in the populace’s feelings toward Ieyasu’s rule of Enshū. Ieyasu’s rule of Enshū at the time was harsh—at the Battle of Horikawa Castle, even women and children were executed—and the people’s dissatisfaction was strong. The story that “that terrifying Lord Ieyasu lost in battle and was helped by the local people” highly likely spread as a venting of the people’s dissatisfaction.

Shingen’s Sudden Death — The End of the Westward Campaign

Takeda Shingen, who won an overwhelming victory at Mikatagahara, passed by Hamamatsu Castle and saw out the year at Osakabe (present-day northern Hamamatsu City). From the first month of 1573 (Genki 4) onward he advanced into Mikawa Province. In the 2nd month he brought down Noda Castle, but from around then Shingen’s condition worsened.

On the 12th day of the 4th month, Shingen died of illness at Komaba in Shinano Province. He was 53. There are various theories about the cause of death—pulmonary tuberculosis, stomach cancer, a hit by a stray bullet—but in any case the westward campaign came to a sudden end. The Takeda army withdrew to Kai while concealing Shingen’s death.

Shingen’s death was the greatest good fortune for Nobunaga and Ieyasu. Nobunaga was freed from the encirclement and immediately headed for the final subjugation of Nagamasa and Yoshikage. Ieyasu held Hamamatsu Castle to the end and weathered the Takeda offensive. That Ieyasu, who suffered a great defeat at Mikatagahara, “suffered no mortal wound” as a result was thanks to the contingency of history that was Shingen’s sudden death.

The Decision of the 31-Year-Old Ieyasu, and Its Influence on His Later Years

At the time of the Battle of Mikatagahara, Ieyasu was 31. Takeda Shingen was a seasoned strategist of 52. With an age difference of over 20 years, their battle experience too differed as heaven from earth. Even so, Ieyasu decided to sortie, and although the result was a great defeat, he survived and held his domain to the end.

How this experience influenced Ieyasu’s life—against the received view that “he learned a cool and composed way of fighting,” reexamination has advanced in recent years. Ieyasu thereafter continued to mount bold gambles—at Komaki and Nagakute, at Sekigahara, at the Siege of Osaka. What he learned from Mikatagahara may have been not “to avoid adventure” but “to prepare thoroughly when one does adventure.”

At the foundation of Ieyasu’s seizure of the realm lay the bond of the Mikawa retainer band, who shared life and death at Mikatagahara. The standing-in of Natsume Yoshinobu, the hard fighting of Honda Tadakatsu, the retainers’ loyalty unto death—these were Ieyasu’s greatest asset and became the foundation of the 260 years of the Tokugawa shogunate. Mikatagahara was, for Ieyasu personally, the humiliation of defeat, but for the Tokugawa house it was also a turning point that strengthened its solidarity.

Battle of Mikatagahara Timeline

Date	Event
1571	Nobunaga burns Mt. Hiei. The anti-Nobunaga encirclement expands; Shingen too gathers in opposition to Nobunaga.
9th month, 29th day, 1572	The Takeda advance force of 5,000 under Yamagata Masakage begins its invasion of Mikawa.
10th month, 3rd day, 1572	Takeda Shingen sets out from Kōfu leading a main force of 20,000 (the westward campaign begins).
10th month, 10th day	The Takeda army enters Tōtōmi Province. Tokugawa-side castles such as Tadarai fall one after another.
10th month, 13th day	The Battle of Hitokotozaka (the prelude to Mikatagahara). With Honda Tadakatsu’s hard rear-guard fight, Ieyasu returns to Hamamatsu Castle.
11th month, 14th day	Akiyama Torashige’s detachment brings down Iwamura Castle in eastern Mino (direct intrusion into Oda territory).
12th month, 19th day	The Battle of Futamata Castle ends. It opens its gates through the Takeda army’s “water-cutting operation.”
Morning, 12th month, 22nd day	Shingen sets out from Futamata Castle toward Hamamatsu. On the way he changes course, passing by Hamamatsu Castle toward Horie Castle.
Afternoon, 12th month, 22nd day	Ieyasu abandons the siege plan and decides to sortie. He advances to the Mikatagahara plateau leading about 11,000 troops.
Evening, 12th month, 22nd day	The Battle of Mikatagahara opens. The Takeda army in fish-scale formation, the Tokugawa army in crane-wing formation, clash.
About sunset, 12th month, 22nd day	The outcome is decided in only about two hours. The Tokugawa army loses 2,000; Ieyasu flees to Hamamatsu Castle. Takeda dead: 200.
Night, 12th month, 22nd day	The night raid at Saigagake (Ieyasu’s side). He strikes back once.
Late 12th month – New Year	Shingen does not attack Hamamatsu Castle, and sees out the year at Osakabe (northern Hamamatsu City).
2nd month, 1573	The Takeda army advances into Mikawa and brings down Noda Castle.
4th month, 12th day, 1573	Takeda Shingen dies of illness at Komaba in Shinano Province. He was 53. The westward campaign ends; the Takeda army withdraws to Kai.
8th–9th months, 1573	After confirming Shingen’s death, Nobunaga destroys the Asakura and Azai clans in succession.
5th month, 1575	The Battle of Nagashino — Takeda Katsuyori is heavily defeated by the allied Oda-Tokugawa army. The revenge battle for Mikatagahara.
3rd month, 1582	The destruction of the Takeda clan (the Battle of Tenmokuzan).

* Dates are in the old (lunar) calendar. Row shading: orange = preparation for the decisive battle; red = the battle and its final settlement; yellow = post-battle developments.

Battle of Mikatagahara: Relationships of the Key Figures of Both Armies

The Takeda Army

Role	Person	Movements in This Battle
Supreme commander	Takeda Shingen	Launched the westward campaign leading a great army of 27,000; overwhelmingly defeated Ieyasu at Mikatagahara. Died of illness four months later.
Takeda Four Heavenly Kings	Yamagata Masakage	Led the Takeda advance force of 5,000 into Mikawa. At the main battle, commanded the left wing.
Takeda Four Heavenly Kings	Baba Nobuharu	The protagonist of the capture of Futamata Castle; at the main battle, commanded the right wing.
Takeda Four Heavenly Kings	Naitō Masahide	One of the centers of combat command at the main battle.
Takeda retainer	Oyamada Nobushige	Served as the vanguard at the main battle. Would later betray Katsuyori.
Detachment	Akiyama Torashige (Nobutomo)	Led a Takeda detachment into eastern Mino, taking Iwamura Castle by bloodless surrender.
Successor	Takeda Katsuyori	Took part in the main battle. Succeeded the Takeda house after Shingen’s death.

The Allied Tokugawa-Oda Army

Role	Person	Movements in This Battle
Supreme commander	Tokugawa Ieyasu	Age 31. Sortied leading about 8,000 Tokugawa troops. Suffered the only great defeat of his life, but returned alive to Hamamatsu Castle.
Reinforcements	Oda Nobunaga	Did not take part himself; dispatched reinforcements of about 3,000.
Tokugawa Four Heavenly Kings	Honda Tadakatsu	Hard rear-guard fight at Hitokotozaka. At the main battle too, guarded the flank of Ieyasu’s headquarters. Praised as “too good for Ieyasu.”
Tokugawa Four Heavenly Kings	Sakai Tadatsugu	Took part as a senior retainer of the Tokugawa army.
Tokugawa retainer	Ishikawa Kazumasa	Took part as a senior retainer of Ieyasu.
Loyal retainer	Natsume Yoshinobu	Died in battle standing in for Ieyasu. A symbol of the loyalty of the Tokugawa house.
Oda reinforcement	Sakuma Nobumori	A reinforcement commander from the Oda house. Cold and not fighting actively, he was later reproached by Nobunaga.
Oda reinforcement	Hirate Hirohide	Grandson of Hirate Masahide, a young Oda commander. Fought hard and died.
Oda reinforcement	Mizuno Nobumoto	Ieyasu’s uncle; took part as an Oda retainer.
Tokugawa retainer	Honda Tadazane	Honda Tadakatsu’s uncle. Died at Mikatagahara.
Tokugawa retainer	Nakane Masateru	Commander of Futamata Castle. After the castle opened, took part at Mikatagahara and died.

Related Historic Site Map — Battle of Mikatagahara

Spots on the Map:

• Hamamatsu Castle (castle) — Ieyasu’s home castle, the place to which he fled back after defeat.
• Hitokotozaka old battlefield (old battlefield) — The site of the Mikatagahara prelude, where Honda Tadakatsu served as rear guard.
• Futamata Castle ruins (castle) — The strongpoint the Takeda army brought down with the “water-cutting operation.”
• Mikatagahara Old Battlefield Monument (old battlefield) — A stone monument standing within the grounds of the Mikatagahara Cemetery. The exact location of the main battlefield is unidentified.
• Saigagake Museum (museum) — The cliff where, on the night of defeat, Ieyasu launched a night raid on the Takeda army. A museum is attached.
• Monument to the Loyalty of Natsume Jirōzaemon Yoshinobu (monument) — A monument honoring the loyal retainer who died standing in for Ieyasu.
• Horie Castle ruins (castle) — The castle Shingen aimed to take, eyeing the water transport of Lake Hamana.

* The map is a reference display based on modern roads. It differs from the roads and terrain of the Sengoku period.

📍 View the route on Google Maps (switchable between car/train)

Related Articles

Battle Articles

• The Kanegasaki Retreat (4th month, 1570) — The starting point of the anti-Nobunaga encirclement, and of Ieyasu’s experience taking part as reinforcements.
• Battle of Anegawa (6th month, 1570) — The battle that put Ieyasu’s reinforcement experience into full gear.
• Battle of Odani Castle (1573) — After Shingen’s death, Nobunaga destroys the Azai clan.
• Battle of Nagashino (1575) — The revenge battle for Mikatagahara, where Takeda Katsuyori is heavily defeated.
• Battle of Takatenjin Castle (1574–) — The struggle between the Takeda and Tokugawa over Tōtōmi.

Warlord Articles

• Tokugawa Ieyasu — Age 31, the young Mikawa daimyō who suffered the only great defeat of his life.
• Takeda Shingen — Age 52, the seasoned strategist who launched the westward campaign. Died of illness four months later.
• Takeda Katsuyori — Took part at Mikatagahara; succeeded to the headship after Shingen’s death.
• Oda Nobunaga — Dispatched reinforcements but did not take part himself.
• Honda Tadakatsu — Fought hard at Hitokotozaka and Mikatagahara; praised as “too good for Ieyasu.”

References

Primary Sources

• Ōta Gyūichi, “Shinchō Kōki” — conveys the course of the Battle of Mikatagahara and Ieyasu’s hard fighting at the time of flight.
• Ōkubo Tadataka, “Mikawa Monogatari” — a record of the battle from the viewpoint of the Tokugawa house. Conveys Ieyasu’s figure retreating “untroubled.”
• “Kōyō Gunkan” — a war chronicle from the Takeda-house viewpoint. Details Shingen’s actions before and after Mikatagahara.
• “Tōdaiki” — a contemporary source, conveying the outline of the battle concisely.

Secondary Sources (Edo Period Onward)

• “Mikawa Go-Fudoki” — compiled in the mid-17th century in the Edo period; the oldest source of the Ieyasu soiling legend (but as a story of Hitokotozaka).
• “Kaisei Mikawa Go-Fudoki” (1837, Tenpō 8) — compiled by Narushima Motonao by order of the 11th shogun Ienari. Verifies the inaccurate descriptions including the soiling legend.
• “Inu Hariko” — an early-Edo kana booklet (by Asai Ryōi), carrying the tale of “the Battle of Mikatagahara” (Migatahara).
• “Tōshōgū Go-Jikki” — the official history compiled by the Edo shogunate.

Major Research Works and Papers

• Hirayama Yū, “A New Theory: Ieyasu and the Battle of Mikatagahara—Reading the Only Great Defeat of His Life” (NHK Publishing, NHK Publishing Shinsho 688, 2020) — an important study reappraising Ieyasu’s sortie judgment as “a rational judgment for the defense of Horie Castle.”
• Hirayama Yū, “Tokugawa Ieyasu and Takeda Shingen” (KADOKAWA, Kadokawa Sensho 664, 2022).
• Hara Fumihiko, “The Riddle of the Portrait of Tokugawa Ieyasu at the Battle of Mikatagahara,” “Kinshachi Sōsho,” vol. 43 (Tokugawa Reimeikai, 2016) — an epoch-making paper completely denying the Mikatagahara-relatedness of the “Shikami portrait.”
• Shiba Hiroyuki, “Tokugawa Ieyasu” (Heibonsha, 2023).
• Honda Takashige, “The Decisions of Tokugawa Ieyasu” (Chūkō Shinsho, 2022).
• Marushima Kazuhiro et al., eds., “Biographical Dictionary of the Takeda Clan Retainer Band” (Tōkyōdō Shuppan, 2015).

Public Papers and Commentary

• Watanabe Daimon, “Was the ‘Shikami Portrait’ Not an Admonition of Mikatagahara? What Is the New Fact That Overturns the Received View?” Yahoo! News Expert, May 2026.
• Watanabe Daimon, “‘Dōsuru Ieyasu’: Is the Anecdote of Tokugawa Ieyasu’s Mishap at the Battle of Mikatagahara Fact?” Yahoo! News Expert, 2025.
• Watanabe Daimon, “Did Tokugawa Ieyasu Really Soil Himself? Verifying the Truth of the Mikatagahara ‘Greatest Humiliation’ Theory,” Yahoo! News Expert, May 2026.
• Rekishijin, “Did Tokugawa Ieyasu Really Have No Path to Victory in the Battle of Mikatagahara Against Takeda Shingen?”
• Tokyo Shimbun, “Was Tokugawa Ieyasu’s ‘Shikami Portrait’ Not Painted as an Admonition Against Conceit?” 2022.

Public Institution Materials

• Hamamatsu City Museum (holder of relics and materials of the Battle of Mikatagahara).
• Saigagake Museum (exhibiting a diorama and materials of the Battle of Mikatagahara).
• Tokugawa Art Museum (the holder of the Shikami portrait).
• Hamamatsu City official tourism guide (Mikatagahara old battlefield, Hamamatsu Castle, and so on).

* This article is composed on the basis of the sources, research works, and papers above, as well as multiple information sources on the web. There are points on which interpretations of history differ even among researchers, and established views may change with the discovery of new sources or the advance of research.