The Kanegasaki Retreat — Nobunaga’s Greatest Crisis: His Brother-in-Law’s Betrayal and a Desperate Withdrawal

4th month, 25th–30th days, 1570 (Genki 1) | Kanegasaki, Tsuruga District, Echizen Province (present-day Tsuruga City, Fukui Prefecture)

The Kanegasaki Retreat in Three Lines

• The withdrawal battle in which Oda Nobunaga, in the midst of his attack on the Asakura, fell into the crisis of a pincer attack through the defection of his brother-in-law, Azai Nagamasa.
• Kinoshita Tōkichirō (Hideyoshi), Akechi Mitsuhide, Ikeda Katsumasa, and others served as the rear guard, and Nobunaga returned alive to Kyoto by way of the Kutsuki crossing.
• A singular battlefield where Nobunaga, Tokugawa Ieyasu, Hideyoshi, Mitsuhide, and Matsunaga Hisahide—heroes who would move later history—gathered all in one place.

The Mainstream View — A Textbook-Based Explanation

Background — Asakura Yoshikage’s Refusal to Come to the Capital

In the 9th month of 1568 (Eiroku 11), Oda Nobunaga succeeded in marching on the capital bearing Ashikaga Yoshiaki, who became the fifteenth shogun of the Muromachi shogunate. With the shogun’s authority behind him, Nobunaga requested the various Sengoku daimyō of the realm to come to the capital. The requests extended widely—not only to the daimyō of the Kinai and the nearby provinces, but to Tokugawa Ieyasu, Takeda Shingen, the Amago of Izumo, and others.

On the 23rd day of the 1st month of 1570 (Eiroku 13), Nobunaga issued a letter urging attendance again: that for the repair of the imperial palace, for the service of the shogunal house, and for the ever-greater tranquility of the realm, the addressees should come to the capital in the middle of the coming 2nd month. But Asakura Yoshikage, who ruled Echizen, continued to ignore the repeated requests. Echizen lay in a geographic position cutting in between Mino and Kyoto, and bringing Echizen under his control was an important task for Nobunaga’s “tranquility of the realm.” Regarding Yoshikage’s refusal to come as “harboring rebellious intent,” Nobunaga at last resolved to take the field.

The Pretext for Taking the Field — Subjugating Mutō of Wakasa

What deserves attention is that Nobunaga did not put forward “the subjugation of the Asakura” as his outward purpose, but raised the banner of “the subjugation of Mutō Tomomasu of Wakasa.” Mutō Tomomasu was a kokujin of Wakasa who, from a position leaning toward the Asakura, had not responded to Shogun Yoshiaki’s request to come to the capital. In a memorandum addressed to Mōri Motonari dated the 10th day of the 7th month (the “Mōri-ke Monjo”), Nobunaga wrote to the following effect.

To paraphrase: a man called Mutō (Tomomasu) at the edge of Wakasa Province was plotting wickedness, and since by the shogun’s will it was commanded that he be punished, Nobunaga set out on the 20th day of the 4th month. Although that Mutō showed no clear defiance, pressure was applied from Echizen, and as grievances were many, Nobunaga advanced as far as Tsuruga District in Echizen.

— Source: “Mōri-ke Monjo,” letter of Oda Nobunaga (memorandum addressed to Mōri Motonari, dated the 10th day of the 7th month of Genki 1)

Behind the justification of “subjugating Mutō” lay a complex situation surrounding the Takeda clan of Wakasa. In 1568 (Eiroku 11), the shugo of Wakasa Province, Takeda Motoaki (a nephew of Ashikaga Yoshiaki), had been carried off to Ichijōdani by the Asakura, and Wakasa Province was in a lordless state with its shugo absent. In effect, Wakasa had become a vassal province of the Asakura. Yoshiaki aimed at the restoration of the Takeda clan of Wakasa, and Nobunaga’s expedition also took on the character of the shogun’s intervention in Wakasa.

The Route of Invasion — From Kyoto to Wakasa, and Then to Echizen

On the 20th day of the 4th month of 1570 (Genki 1), Nobunaga set out from Kyoto. Among the army were, besides Oda retainers, Tokugawa Ieyasu (Nobunaga’s ally), Matsunaga Hisahide (a powerful figure of the Kinai), Ikeda Katsumasa (shugo of Settsu), Miyoshi Yoshinaga, and even courtiers who were close attendants of the shogun. About 30,000 strong, it was a great army with the character less of an Oda private war than of a “shogunal army.”

According to volume three of the “Shinchō Kōki,” Nobunaga’s line of march was as follows.

• 4th month, 20th day: departs Kyoto, passes through Sakamoto, and encamps at Wani on the west shore of Lake Biwa.
• 4th month, 21st day: lodges at Tanaka Castle in Takashima.
• 4th month, 22nd day: lodges at the residence of Matsumiya Genba at Kumagawa in Wakasa (present-day Wakasa Town, Fukui Prefecture).
• 4th month, 23rd day: encamps at Kuniyoshi Castle of Awaya Echizen-no-kami at Sagaki in Wakasa (also staying on the 24th).
• 4th month, 25th day: advances to Tsuruga in Echizen and attacks Tezutsuyama Castle.

What deserves attention is that Nobunaga’s army did not carry out the “subjugation of Mutō Tomomasu” that was its pretext. Rather than heading for Ōi District in Wakasa, where Mutō’s stronghold of Ishiyama Castle lay, it went north along the Tango Road and entered Kuniyoshi Castle at Sagaki in Mikata District. Kuniyoshi Castle was a friendly castle on the Oda side, which a chief retainer of the Takeda clan of Wakasa, Awaya Katsuhisa, had kept holding as the front line of the war against the Asakura. It is thought that within the Oda camp it was clear from the outset that “subjugating Mutō” was merely a pretext for taking the field, and that the true target was the Asakura clan.

The Capture of Tezutsuyama Castle and Kanegasaki Castle

On the 25th day of the 4th month, the Oda army advanced to Tsuruga. After confirming the surrounding situation, Nobunaga first launched an attack on Tezutsuyama Castle. Tezutsuyama Castle was a steep mountain castle, a difficult position whose southeast “towered ruggedly” (per the “Shinchō Kōki”), but Nobunaga repeatedly gave the order “press the attack,” and the Oda army mounted a fierce assault. Kinoshita Tōkichirō (later Toyotomi Hideyoshi), Shibata Katsuie, Tokugawa Ieyasu, and others joined the attack, and according to the “Ietada Nikki Zōho” they took 1,370 heads and brought the castle down.

The next day, the 26th, the Oda army began its attack on Kanegasaki Castle, to the northwest of Tezutsuyama. Defending Kanegasaki Castle was Asakura Kagetsune, a cousin of Asakura Yoshikage and the foremost of the clan’s kinsmen. But the castle troops, having lost their will to fight with the fall of Tezutsuyama, sued for surrender, and Kanegasaki Castle opened its gates in less than a day. Hikida Castle to the south also opened its gates. The Oda army nearly subdued all of Tsuruga District.

Asakura Kagetsune afterward returned to Ichijōdani, but was denounced by the kinsmen as “a disgrace to the Asakura name” and forced into retirement, dying soon after. There is also a theory that, out of a struggle over rank within the clan, the head house under Asakura Yoshikage and figures such as Asakura Kageakira and Asakura Kagetake deliberately delayed reinforcements to Kagetsune; the early surrender of Kanegasaki Castle may have reflected internal conflict among the Asakura kinsmen.

“It Must Be a False Report” — The News of Azai Nagamasa’s Defection

Having subdued Tsuruga District, the Oda army was about to cross Kinome Pass, aiming at last at the Asakura stronghold of Ichijōdani. At that very moment, a shocking report flew to Nobunaga: that Azai Nagamasa of northern Ōmi had turned against the Oda and raised arms.

A famous passage of the “Shinchō Kōki” conveys this moment. To paraphrase: as Nobunaga was about to cross Kinome Pass and storm into the interior of Echizen, reports came in one after another that Azai Bizen-no-kami (Nagamasa) of northern Ōmi had betrayed him. Yet because Azai was a clear relative by marriage and had moreover been entrusted with all of northern Ōmi, there could be no cause for dissatisfaction, and Nobunaga thought “it must be a false report.” But when factual reports came in from all sides, he said “it cannot be helped,” and left Kinoshita Tōkichirō behind at Kanegasaki Castle.

— Source: Ōta Gyūichi, “Shinchō Kōki,” vol. 3

Nobunaga’s first reaction—”it must be a false report”—tells how deeply he had trusted Nagamasa. His true feeling was that an ally who was his brother-in-law, to whom he had married his sister Oichi, and to whom he had entrusted northern Ōmi, could not possibly betray him. But when report after report made Nagamasa’s defection certain, Nobunaga instantly switched his judgment to “it cannot be helped.” The speed of his situational awareness and decision-making was Nobunaga’s true mark.

The Start of the Withdrawal — Forming the Rear Guard

Because the Oda army had advanced deep into Echizen, it stood in the crisis of a pincer: the Asakura army ahead and the Azai army behind. The conceivable lines of retreat were the West Ōmi Road (the west shore of Lake Biwa), by which they had advanced, and the Wakasa Road (the Tango Road); but the West Ōmi Road was close to the Azai sphere of power and dangerous. Nobunaga resolved to withdraw by the least dangerous route, the Wakasa Road.

To prepare against the Asakura army’s pursuit, Nobunaga left a rear guard at Kanegasaki Castle. As to who served in the rear guard, the “Shinchō Kōki” records only the name of Kinoshita Tōkichirō, but according to the contemporary source the “Buke Unsen”—a letter of Isshiki Fujinaga dated the 4th day of the 5th month of Genki 1—the rear guard was “Kinoshita Tōkichirō, Akechi Mitsuhide, Ikeda Katsumasa, and others.” Ikeda Katsumasa was shugo of Settsu, a commander clearly of higher rank than Tōkichirō. As for Ieyasu, secondary sources on the Tokugawa side such as the “Kan’ei Shoka Keizuden” and “Tokugawa Jikki” record that “Ieyasu joined the rear guard,” but his name is not found in the primary sources.

The Kutsuki Crossing — A Desperate March to Kyoto

On the 28th day of the 4th month, Nobunaga began the withdrawal. On the retreat route from Wakasa into Ōmi lay the Kutsuki valley, ruled by a kokujin of Ōmi named Kutsuki Mototsuna. The Kutsuki had ties to the Azai as well, and whether they would permit Nobunaga’s passage was unpredictable.

According to the “Asakura-ki,” Kutsuki Mototsuna at first intended to kill Nobunaga and side with the Azai. The one who carried out a desperate persuasion here was Matsunaga Hisahide. Through Matsunaga’s negotiation, Kutsuki Mototsuna not only permitted Nobunaga’s passage but received him hospitably (the Kutsuki crossing). Matsunaga Hisahide had long handled diplomacy between Nobunaga, Yoshiaki, and the Kutsuki, and it may be said that his personal connection with the Kutsuki saved Nobunaga’s life.

On the 30th day of the 4th month, Nobunaga returned to Kyoto by way of the Kutsuki crossing. The great army that had at first exceeded 30,000 had suffered great losses in the desperate withdrawal. According to the “Tamon-in Nikki,” there is a hearsay account that “some two thousand or more men were lost,” while the “Asakura Kaki” records that “the troops were thrown into disorder, but the principal commanders were unharmed.” There are various theories about the scale of the damage, but it is certain that Nobunaga’s keeping his life was miraculous.

The Rear Guard at Kanegasaki Castle — The True Protagonist of the Withdrawal

While Nobunaga’s main force advanced through the Kutsuki crossing, the rear guard left at Kanegasaki Castle faced the pursuit of both the Asakura and Azai armies. The rear guard of Hideyoshi, Mitsuhide, Ikeda Katsumasa, and others skillfully used gun and bow units to keep the enemy at bay and carried out the withdrawal in good order.

What deserves attention is that the Asakura army’s pursuit was not as fierce as expected. As reinforcements to Kagetsune had been delayed by discord within the clan, so the Asakura army as a whole did not go over to an aggressive offensive. The Asakura had let slip a fatal chance to catch Nobunaga. Later, it would be appraised that “the conduct of the Oda commanders was extremely well-disciplined, giving the Asakura army no opening, and they held the losses of the withdrawal to a minimum” (the “Asakura Kaki”).

After returning to Kyoto, Nobunaga again dispatched Akechi Mitsuhide and Niwa Nagahide to Wakasa Province and carried out the subjugation of Mutō Tomomasu, the original pretext. Mutō Tomomasu offered his mother as a hostage and surrendered. Mitsuhide and Niwa returned to Kyoto on the 6th day of the 5th month. In form, at least, the “subjugation of Mutō” was completed.

On the 9th day of the 5th month, Nobunaga set out for his return to Gifu with an army of 20,000. On the way, wary of remnants of the Rokkaku and the movements of the Azai, he returned to Gifu by way of Sekigahara. That 6th month, Nobunaga swiftly turned to the counterattack, dealing a heavy blow to the allied Azai-Asakura army at the Battle of Anegawa. The speed of the counterattack that wiped away the humiliation of Kanegasaki was Nobunaga’s true mark.

Multiple Theories — Exploring Possibilities from Various Angles

Theory 1: What Was Nobunaga’s True Purpose in Taking the Field?

Regarding the purpose of taking the field at Kanegasaki, the gap between the outward pretext and the reality is large, and several interpretations stand side by side even among researchers.

(1) The Mutō Tomomasu subjugation theory (the outward pretext)

As noted above, Nobunaga explained in his memorandum to Mōri Motonari that “the subjugation of Mutō of Wakasa was by the shogun’s will, and he set out on the 20th day of the 4th month.” Mutō Tomomasu was a Wakasa figure leaning toward the Asakura who had not responded to Shogun Yoshiaki’s request to come to the capital. As a pretext, this subjugation of Mutō was the stated reason for taking the field.

In reality, however, the Oda army did not head for Mutō’s stronghold of Ishiyama Castle, but went north along the Tango Road, entered Kuniyoshi Castle, and pressed straight on into Tsuruga in Echizen. That “subjugating Mutō” was a pretext for subjugating the Asakura is the current received view.

(2) The Asakura subjugation theory (the substantive purpose)

The theory that Nobunaga’s true purpose was the subjugation of the Asakura, using Yoshikage’s refusal to come to the capital as a pretext. Echizen was a strategic point cutting in between Mino and Kyoto, and for Nobunaga’s vision of “tranquility of the realm” the existence of the Asakura clan was an obstacle. Because raising “the subjugation of the Asakura” directly would have made it hard to mount an expedition borrowing the shogun’s authority, he put the subjugation of Mutō on the surface—this is the interpretation. It can be called the most moderate and widely accepted theory.

(3) The Takeda Motoaki rescue theory (the Yoshiaki-led theory)

An intriguing theory presented in recent years holds that the true purpose of the expedition was the rescue of the Takeda clan of Wakasa by Shogun Ashikaga Yoshiaki. According to Takazawa Hitoshi’s “New Shinchō Kōki,” there is a possibility that Yoshiaki was trying to rescue the shugo of Wakasa, Takeda Motoaki (Yoshiaki’s nephew), from the state of confinement at Ichijōdani into which the Asakura had carried him.

The “Kawashima Monjo” records that shogunal direct retainers such as Suwa Toshisato and Matsuda Yoritaka, and Kawashima Echizen-no-kami, were involved in assembling warships for the rescue of Takeda Motoaki. This was a movement of shogunal forces, not Oda retainers, suggesting the possibility that the expedition was not simply Nobunaga’s personal ambition but a shogunal enterprise led by Yoshiaki.

This theory is also consistent with the fact that Kinoshita Tōkichirō, who served as Kyoto magistrate, issued documents to 36 Wakasa men serving the Takeda clan of Wakasa, demanding confirmation of their landholdings and loyalty to the head of the Takeda house. The framing is that Yoshiaki aimed at the restoration of the Takeda clan of Wakasa, and Nobunaga acted as the unit that carried it out.

(4) The Echizen strategic-key-point theory

In Nobunaga’s vision of the realm, Echizen was important not merely as “a Sengoku daimyō who refused to come to the capital” but as a strategic key point commanding the north of Kyoto. Maritime transport on the Japan Sea side (the port of Tsuruga), the gateway to the Hokuriku, a position threatening the rear of Kyoto—taking these together, to leave Echizen under Asakura control would be a fatal weakness for Nobunaga’s vision of tranquility.

That Kanegasaki Castle was a castle commanding the port of Tsuruga, a key point of Japan Sea maritime transport, also cannot be overlooked. An interpretation holds that Nobunaga aimed at Kanegasaki Castle from the start, and that the subjugation of Mutō was a complete pretext.

Rather than any one of these theories being the single correct answer, it is highly likely that several factors were combined. The point recent research has nearly reached is that it was an expedition with a three-layered structure: “the shogun’s restoration of the Takeda of Wakasa,” “the Oda’s securing of Echizen,” and “the subjugation of the Asakura as a shogunal army.”

Theory 2: Is Lady Oichi’s “Bag of Beans” Legend Historical Fact?

The most famous episode of the Battle of Kanegasaki is the “bag of beans” legend of Lady Oichi. The story is that Oichi—Nagamasa’s principal wife and Nobunaga’s sister—sent, as a battlefield gift to Nobunaga, a bag of beans tied at both ends, hinting at a “pincer attack.” Repeatedly depicted in NHK historical dramas and novels, it is one of the most striking anecdotes even of the Sengoku period.

But the view that this anecdote is a later invention is now the mainstream. Its only source is the “Asakura Kaki,” compiled in the Edo period, and there is no mention whatsoever in other highly reliable contemporary sources. The historian Watanabe Daimon also examines the credibility of this anecdote negatively in “Was Lady Oichi’s secret report fact? The truth of the ‘bag of beans legend’ that told of her husband Azai Nagamasa’s betrayal” (Yahoo! News).

Still, the possibility that Oichi conveyed information remains

It should not end merely by dismissing it as invention. As a custom of the time, a woman who married out in a political marriage between daimyō had an aspect of being a “diplomat and intelligence agent” sent from her birth house into her husband’s house. There is ample possibility that Oichi too obtained, as information, the changing situation surrounding the two houses, and played the role of conveying it to her birth house, the Oda.

The “Shinchō Kōki” states that Nobunaga at first did not believe Nagamasa’s defection, thinking “it must be a false report,” and it does not record that there was advance information from Oichi. On the other hand, Nobunaga’s letter in the “Mōri-ke Monjo” states that “word that Azai Bizen-no-kami had turned traitor came on the way back to the capital,” suggesting that Nobunaga learned of Nagamasa’s rising during the withdrawal.

In other words, what can be confirmed from the sources is only the fact that “Nobunaga learned of Nagamasa’s defection during the withdrawal”; Oichi’s involvement cannot be confirmed. It is reasonable to judge that the symbolic device of a “bag of beans” was a later invention.

Why did this anecdote spread?

It is thought to be a story devised by later generations to express symbolically Oichi’s dilemma of “brother or husband.” The strange cipher of a bean bag tied at both ends mirrors the double bind within Oichi’s own heart. To save her brother would be to betray her husband; to obey her husband would be to abandon her brother—the image of a beautiful sister who overcame this ultimate conflict with wit and quick thinking strongly stirred the imagination of later generations.

In the 2020 NHK drama “Kirin ga Kuru,” a novel arrangement was made in which Oichi’s lady-in-waiting Azuki put a letter into a bag stuffed with beans and delivered it to Ieyasu. While it cannot be asserted as historical fact, it was a skillful dramatization that carried on the interpretation that Oichi’s position was that of a conveyer of information.

Theory 3: Who Served in the Rear Guard?

The Kanegasaki retreat is often told as “Hideyoshi’s great feat.” But recent research has cast great doubt on the “Hideyoshi alone” theory.

The “Shinchō Kōki” account — Hideyoshi only

Volume three of Ōta Gyūichi’s “Shinchō Kōki” records of the rear guard only that “Kinoshita Tōkichirō was left behind at Kanegasaki Castle,” and gives no name other than Tōkichirō. The later “Taikōki” used this account to dramatize Hideyoshi’s volunteering for the rear guard as a heroic tale. This is the direct origin of the “Hideyoshi’s great feat” image.

The “Buke Unsen” account — a three-man arrangement

But the letter of Isshiki Fujinaga dated the 4th day of the 5th month of Genki 1 (contained in the “Buke Unsen”) is extremely important as a primary source produced soon after the event. It clearly states that “Kinoshita Tōkichirō, Akechi Mitsuhide, Ikeda Katsumasa, and others were left at Kanegasaki Castle.” The historian Watanabe Daimon points out that, given the nature of this source, it is more reasonable to understand that the rear guard was borne not by Hideyoshi alone but by several commanders.

In particular, Ikeda Katsumasa was shugo of Settsu, a commander clearly of higher rank than Tōkichirō. The received view that Tōkichirō, a mere retainer, served as the “commander” of the rear guard over the heads of the shugo of Settsu and Akechi Mitsuhide has thin documentary grounds.

The problem of the Tokugawa Ieyasu rear-guard theory

As for Ieyasu too, secondary sources such as the “Kan’ei Shoka Keizuden” and “Tokugawa Jikki” record that “Ieyasu joined the rear guard and fought hard, himself firing a gun.” But these accounts rest on the Tokugawa-centered historiography of the Edo period, and Ieyasu’s name is not found in the primary sources. That Ieyasu accompanied the Battle of Kanegasaki is itself certain, but whether he served in the rear guard is doubtful. The May 2023 issue of the magazine “Rekishijin” also points out that “Ieyasu’s exploits in the Kanegasaki retreat are written only in secondary sources such as the ‘Kan’ei Shoka Keizuden’ and ‘Tokugawa Jikki.'”

On the other hand, for Ieyasu the Battle of Kanegasaki was his first experience of “participating as reinforcements in another daimyō’s war,” and there is also a tradition that he was not informed of the withdrawal in advance by Nobunaga but heard of it from Hideyoshi. Ieyasu’s agitation can well be imagined, but the possibility that he greatly contributed to the withdrawal cannot be denied.

Akechi Mitsuhide’s role

In recent years, in place of the “Hideyoshi alone” theory, Akechi Mitsuhide’s role has been reassessed. Mitsuhide was in the special position of serving both Nobunaga and Yoshiaki, and he handled diplomacy and intelligence in the Wakasa and Ōmi directions. A letter from Mitsuhide to Hosokawa Fujitaka and others, dated the 20th day of the 4th month of Genki 1 (the “Miyake-ke Monjo”), already records his wariness of the movements of Echizen (the Asakura) and the northern district (the Azai), making it highly likely that Mitsuhide had sensed the abnormality in advance.

In the 2020 NHK drama “Kirin ga Kuru,” a scene was depicted in which Mitsuhide was active as the core of the rear guard. This can be called a reasonable interpretation in light of the sources as well.

In conclusion, the current leading view is that the Kanegasaki rear guard was not “Hideyoshi alone” but a three-man arrangement of Ikeda Katsumasa, Akechi Mitsuhide, and Kinoshita Tōkichirō, with their respective forces coordinating to carry out the withdrawal. The heroic tale of Hideyoshi alone was probably a “Taikōki”-style dramatization meant to extol the achievements of the man who later became ruler of the realm.

Theory 4: Was It Really a “Desperate Plight”? — The Kuniyoshi Castle Withdrawal Theory

The Kanegasaki retreat has been told as Nobunaga’s “greatest crisis of his life” and “a desperate plight.” Partly through the influence of the “Taikōki,” the dramatic image of a great pursuit—Nobunaga fleeing to Kyoto with his life barely intact under the pursuit of both the Asakura and Azai armies—has become fixed. But recent research has added a reexamination to this “desperate plight” image as well.

Kuniyoshi Castle, a safe forward base

According to the history article “A New Theory of the Kanegasaki Retreat” carried on Serai.jp, Kuniyoshi Castle in Wakasa was a safe forward base for the Oda army. Kuniyoshi Castle was the residence of Awaya Katsuhisa, a chief retainer of the Takeda of Wakasa, known as an “impregnable castle” that had continued to resist Asakura rule. It was a castle where the Oda army stayed two nights during its advance, and its lord, who had a record of service on the front line of the war against the Asakura, was alive and well on the Oda side.

By this view, the “Kanegasaki retreat” is closer to reality understood not as an action of fleeing all the way to Kyoto at once, but as a withdrawal that first fell back to the safe forward base of Kuniyoshi Castle. Kuniyoshi Castle was located so as to command Koshigoe Pass and Tsubaki Pass, through which the Tango Road ran, and it is highly likely that it functioned as a defensive line by which the Oda side cut off the Asakura army’s pursuit.

Doubting the “Taikōki” dramatization

The dramatic great pursuit depicted by the “Taikōki” is highly likely to include later dramatization. There was indeed surely a danger of the rear units being attacked by pursuers and stragglers-hunters, but the recent view is that Nobunaga’s main force was not constantly exposed to mortal danger.

As the “Asakura Kaki” states that “the troops were thrown into disorder, but the principal commanders were unharmed,” no deaths of commander-class figures have been confirmed. The hearsay of the “Tamon-in Nikki” gives losses of 2,000, but this is hearsay information, and the actual damage is unknown. At the very least, the fact that not a single principal commander on the Oda side died is at odds with the image of a “desperate plight.”

The weakness of the Asakura army’s pursuit

Another point not to be overlooked is that the Asakura army’s pursuit was not as fierce as expected. By the same structure in which Asakura Kagetsune, defending Kanegasaki Castle, could not obtain reinforcements owing to the struggle over rank with the head house, the Asakura army as a whole did not go onto an aggressive offensive. The Asakura had originally let slip a fatal chance to catch Nobunaga.

In later years Nobunaga is said to have pointed out the “weak soldiers” of the Asakura army, but rather than the Asakura army being simply weak, it should be seen that the discord and lack of decisiveness within the Asakura clan were decisive. Yoshikage himself, despite the Oda army’s having invaded Echizen territory, did not dispatch a full-scale relief force. The naivety of the Asakura clan’s strategic judgment may even have been the greatest factor that saved Nobunaga.

Of course, there is no doubt that for Nobunaga personally it was a shocking experience. The betrayal of a brother-in-law to whom he had married his sister, isolation in the depths of Echizen, securing a line of retreat—each was a difficult situation. But as to whether it was the “great pursuit with no guarantee of life for even a moment” that later stories depict, the point recent research has reached is that, as far as the sources can be read, it was not so much so.

Theory 5: How Did Nobunaga Learn of Nagamasa’s Defection?

The circumstances and timing of how Nobunaga learned of Azai Nagamasa’s defection also differ by source, and several theories stand side by side.

(1) The Matsunaga Hisahide report theory (the “Asakura-ki”)

The “Asakura-ki” records that Matsunaga Hisahide, who handled diplomacy and intelligence in the Ōmi and Wakasa directions, noticed suspicious movements on the Azai side and reported them to Nobunaga. Matsunaga was in a position to come and go with both Nobunaga and Yoshiaki and had his own intelligence networks in various regions. Considering that Hisahide also succeeded in persuading Kutsuki Mototsuna, this theory has a certain plausibility.

However, the “Asakura-ki” is a record on the Asakura side and its credibility is questioned, so whether Matsunaga Hisahide actually reported it cannot be confirmed.

(2) The Akechi Mitsuhide advance-detection theory (the “Miyake-ke Monjo”)

A letter from Akechi Mitsuhide, accompanying the army, to Hosokawa Fujitaka and others in the capital, dated the 20th day of the 4th month of Genki 1 (the “Miyake-ke Monjo”), already records his wariness of the movements of Echizen (the Asakura) and the northern district (the Azai). This is a letter from the very day the Oda army set out from Kyoto, showing that Mitsuhide had been directing his attention to the Azai’s movements from before the departure.

This letter suggests the possibility that the Oda side had not entirely failed to anticipate the abnormality of the Azai. Diplomacy-and-intelligence officers like Mitsuhide probably sensed the movements of the pro-Asakura faction within the Azai house and were on alert. That said, Nagamasa’s final decision to defect was sudden, and the Oda side had no time to respond fully.

(3) Nobunaga’s letter in the “Mōri-ke Monjo” — the during-withdrawal recognition theory

Another important source is the memorandum Nobunaga himself addressed to Mōri Motonari (the “Mōri-ke Monjo”). It records that “word that Azai Bizen-no-kami (Nagamasa) had turned traitor came on the way back to the capital.” This suggests that Nobunaga learned of Nagamasa’s rising during the withdrawal.

The “Shinchō Kōki” states that the report of Nagamasa’s defection came in as Nobunaga “was about to cross Kinome Pass and storm into the interior of Echizen,” and combining this with the account of the “Mōri-ke Monjo,” a flow emerges in which Nobunaga received the news near Kinome Pass, began the withdrawal, and then confirmed the gravity of the situation by additional information even during the retreat.

(4) The bag-of-beans legend (the “Asakura Kaki”)

As noted above, the anecdote that Nobunaga sensed it through Oichi’s “bag of beans” has its only source in the “Asakura Kaki” and is highly likely an invention. Still, the possibility cannot be denied that Oichi, in the role of a woman married out in a political marriage, bore the task of conveying changes in the situation of the two houses to her birth house.

Taking these sources together, the circumstances by which Nobunaga learned of Nagamasa’s defection can be inferred to have been as follows:

1. From before the departure, intelligence officers such as Akechi Mitsuhide were wary of the movements of the pro-Asakura faction within the Azai house.
2. Around the 28th day of the 4th month, when he was about to cross Kinome Pass, the first report of the Azai defection came in.
3. Nobunaga at first judged it “a false report,” but recognized it as fact through subsequent reports.
4. Additional information came in even during the withdrawal, and the whole picture gradually became clear.

Rather than a single dramatic episode such as “Oichi’s bag of beans” or “Matsunaga Hisahide’s report,” the reality was probably that information came in gradually from several routes.

Viewed Strategically

Viewing the Kanegasaki retreat from the standpoint of strategy, two lessons emerge: the speed of Nobunaga’s decision-making, and the fragility of the alliance relationships of Sengoku daimyō.

First, the speed of Nobunaga’s decision. The time from receiving the report of Nagamasa’s defection to the decision to withdraw was extremely short. The “Shinchō Kōki” records concisely that “saying ‘it cannot be helped,’ he left Kinoshita Tōkichirō behind at Kanegasaki Castle,” but packed into this one sentence is the decisiveness of a Sengoku daimyō who instantly appraised a crisis and resolutely cut his losses.

Nobunaga discarded a perfect opportunity to attack the Asakura and chose to withdraw at once, even abandoning the gains of subduing Tsuruga District. He took no intermediate option such as “returning after completing the subjugation of Mutō” or “turning to counterattack while holding the gains of Kanegasaki,” and staked everything on the withdrawal with the highest probability of survival. It was precisely this decisiveness that kept Nobunaga alive. The words “it cannot be helped” (there is no use debating it) would later become the last words Nobunaga himself uttered at the Honnō-ji Incident; that the same phrase is used here too is intriguing. For Nobunaga, “it cannot be helped” was, at the same time as a resignation in the face of an unavoidable situation, a word of decision meaning immediate action.

Second, the fragility of the alliance relationships of Sengoku daimyō. The alliance of Nobunaga and Nagamasa was a marriage alliance in which Nobunaga had married out his sister Oichi—the most solid form of alliance of the Sengoku period. Moreover, Nobunaga had entrusted all of northern Ōmi to Nagamasa and treated him generously through Tōkichirō. Even so, Nagamasa defected. The cold reality stands out in relief: that a Sengoku-period alliance could easily be overturned by composite factors such as the inclinations of the house, the strategic outlook of the retainer band, and traditional ties of cooperation.

That Nobunaga at first did not believe Nagamasa’s defection, thinking “it must be a false report,” was not a lack of ability to understand people but a rational judgment by the common sense of the Sengoku period—”an ally treated this generously could not possibly betray me.” But Nagamasa’s decision was derived not from the two-party relationship of Nobunaga and Nagamasa but from structural factors of the Azai house as a whole (the relationship with the Asakura since Sukemasa’s time, the makeup of the retainer band, the inclinations of his father Hisamasa, and so on), and however good a rule Nobunaga personally extended to Nagamasa, it was difficult to overturn the logic of the house.

Third, the significance of the battlefield where the three heroes of the Sengoku era, plus Mitsuhide and Matsunaga Hisahide, gathered all in one place. Many of the principal figures who would move later history shared their fate on this one battlefield.

• Oda Nobunaga: the aspirant to rule the realm, with twelve years left until the Honnō-ji Incident.
• Tokugawa Ieyasu: age 29, lord of Okazaki Castle, a Mikawa daimyō not long after taking the name “Tokugawa.”
• Toyotomi Hideyoshi: “Kinoshita Tōkichirō,” one of Nobunaga’s powerful retainers.
• Akechi Mitsuhide: in the special position of serving both Nobunaga and Yoshiaki.
• Matsunaga Hisahide: a great figure of the Kinai, his relationship with Nobunaga still good.

Had even one of them died in this withdrawal, it is highly likely that the subsequent history of Japan would have changed greatly. Had Hideyoshi died in the rear guard, there would have been neither the “great return march from the Chūgoku” after Honnō-ji nor the “unification of the realm.” Had Ieyasu died, there would have been no 260-year history of the Tokugawa shogunate. Had Mitsuhide died, the Honnō-ji Incident might not have happened. It is a battlefield that strongly impresses upon one the contingency of history.

Fourth, the influence the Kanegasaki retreat had on Nobunaga’s subsequent strategy. The experience of this defeat engraved upon Nobunaga two lessons: “overconfidence in an ally is forbidden” and “a delay in decision is fatal.” Thereafter Nobunaga came to take an unsparing attitude even toward retainers and allies. His thorough annihilation of Nagamasa and Asakura Yoshikage, and his later subjugation of Matsunaga Hisahide and Araki Murashige, can also be seen as having become harsh precisely because of the humiliation of Kanegasaki.

Moreover, only two months after the Kanegasaki defeat, on the 28th day of the 6th month, Nobunaga defeated the allied Azai-Asakura army at the Battle of Anegawa, and three years later, in the 8th month of 1573 (Tenshō 1), he destroyed Asakura Yoshikage at Ichijōdani, and in the 9th month, Nagamasa at Odani Castle. So persistent a war of revenge is rare even in the Sengoku period. For Nobunaga, the humiliation of Kanegasaki was a lifelong stain, a debt that absolutely had to be repaid.

The naivety of Asakura Yoshikage’s strategic judgment must also be pointed out here. Letting Nobunaga slip away at the Battle of Kanegasaki, failing to finish him at the Battle of Anegawa, agreeing to a truce at the Shiga Campaign, failing to coordinate with Takeda Shingen’s westward campaign—Yoshikage let slip chance after chance to dispatch Nobunaga. This is why he is appraised by later ages as “no great general,” and it can be said that the beginning of it was the Battle of Kanegasaki.

Finally, the Kanegasaki retreat was also “a battle that made heroes.” For Hideyoshi it became the starting point of a tale of advancement in which, through the “Taikōki,” he was deified as the “commander of the rear guard,” and for Ieyasu too it was passed down in Tokugawa historiography as “the first experience of participating as reinforcements in another daimyō’s war.” History is written by the victors, but it is sometimes written, too, by those who survived even without being victors. Kanegasaki was a typical example of that.

Famous Words and Sayings of This Battle

“It must be a false report.”

The words Oda Nobunaga uttered at Kanegasaki, at first not believing the report of Nagamasa’s defection. A passage recorded in the “Shinchō Kōki,” it shows how deeply Nobunaga trusted Nagamasa. The words convey both Nobunaga’s astonishment that his brother-in-law, the man who had taken his sister to wife, would betray him, and the depth of his trust in Nagamasa. Contrasted with the following “it cannot be helped,” they make the amplitude of Nobunaga’s emotion and the speed of his decision stand out.

— Ōta Gyūichi, “Shinchō Kōki,” vol. 3

“It cannot be helped.”

The words Nobunaga uttered upon acknowledging that Nagamasa’s defection was certain. It is a declaration of decision: “there is no use debating it; act at once.” Nobunaga decided on withdrawal immediately, left Kinoshita Tōkichirō at Kanegasaki Castle, and escaped to Kyoto by the Kutsuki crossing. These words are the same as the last words Nobunaga uttered twelve years later upon hearing of Mitsuhide’s treachery at the Honnō-ji Incident, and they became words that symbolize Nobunaga’s life.

— Ōta Gyūichi, “Shinchō Kōki,” vol. 3

“Kinoshita Tōkichirō was left behind at Kanegasaki Castle.”

The concise sentence by which the “Shinchō Kōki” recorded the rear guard. That it left the name of Hideyoshi alone became the origin of the “Hideyoshi’s great feat” image leading to the later “Taikōki.” But the contemporary source the “Buke Unsen” gives a three-man arrangement with Ikeda Katsumasa and Akechi Mitsuhide, and it has been pointed out that the “Shinchō Kōki” account gives an impression biased toward Hideyoshi.

— Ōta Gyūichi, “Shinchō Kōki,” vol. 3

Anecdotes and Episodes of the Kanegasaki Retreat

Taking the Field as a Shogunal Army — A Sengoku All-Star Cast

Looking at the list of commanders who accompanied the Battle of Kanegasaki, it takes on the very appearance of a “Sengoku all-star cast.” Oda Nobunaga, Tokugawa Ieyasu, Kinoshita Tōkichirō (Hideyoshi), Akechi Mitsuhide, Matsunaga Hisahide, Ikeda Katsumasa, Niwa Nagahide, Shibata Katsuie, Miyoshi Yoshinaga, Takigawa Kazumasu, Sakuma Nobumori—those who would later take the realm, those who would support it, those who would oppose it, all gathered on one battlefield.

This expedition was not an Oda private war but had the character of a “shogunal army.” It was an expedition based on the will of Shogun Ashikaga Yoshiaki, and even courtiers who were the shogun’s close attendants accompanied it. The great army of about 30,000 was of a scale among the foremost even of the Sengoku period.

The Hospitable Reception at Kuniyoshi Castle

On the 23rd day of the 4th month, Nobunaga entered Kuniyoshi Castle at Sagaki in Wakasa. Its lord, Awaya Katsuhisa, was a chief retainer of the Takeda of Wakasa who had continued for many years to resist Asakura invasion. According to the “Kuniyoshi Rōjōki,” Nobunaga thanked Awaya Echizen-no-kami for his many years of toil on the battle lines against the Asakura, and is said to have granted an audience even to the local samurai who had fought alongside him, such as Tanabe Handayū.

After staying two nights, on the 25th the army set out from Kuniyoshi Castle and attacked into Tsuruga. It is highly likely that Kuniyoshi Castle could function as a safe forward base during the withdrawal as well, playing an important role in both the advance and the retreat of the Oda army.

The Tragedy of Asakura Kagetsune

Asakura Kagetsune, who defended Kanegasaki Castle, was a cousin of Asakura Yoshikage and the foremost of the clan’s kinsmen. But losing his will to fight with the fall of Tezutsuyama Castle, he opened Kanegasaki Castle and surrendered in only a single day.

This is an event that cannot be explained by mere faintheartedness. It has been pointed out that, out of a struggle over rank within the Asakura clan, the head house under Asakura Yoshikage, and figures such as Asakura Kageakira and Asakura Kagetake, may have deliberately delayed reinforcements to Kagetsune. Unable to receive support from the head house, isolated and unaided, Kagetsune was forced to surrender.

Afterward Kagetsune returned to Ichijōdani, but was fiercely denounced by the kinsmen as “a disgrace to the Asakura name” and forced into retirement. He is said to have died soon after, in despair. Three years before the fall of the Asakura, the unity of the clan had already collapsed.

Matsunaga Hisahide’s Persuasion of Kutsuki

When Nobunaga escaped to Kyoto by the Kutsuki crossing, the greatest obstacle was the disposition of Kutsuki Mototsuna. The Kutsuki were a kokujin ruling Takashima District in Ōmi and had ties to the Azai. According to the “Asakura-ki,” Kutsuki Mototsuna at first intended to kill Nobunaga and side with the Azai.

The one who saved Nobunaga’s life here was Matsunaga Hisahide. Hisahide had long been in charge of diplomacy between Nobunaga, Yoshiaki, and the Kutsuki, and had personal connections with Kutsuki Mototsuna. Hisahide carried out a desperate persuasion, and Kutsuki Mototsuna in the end not only permitted Nobunaga’s passage but received him hospitably.

Speaking of Matsunaga Hisahide, the image of a “villainous hero” and “wickedness” is strong, but his work at this time was a great achievement that saved Nobunaga’s life. Ironically, in a later year (1577) Hisahide would turn against Nobunaga and blow himself up at Shigisan Castle. The man who saved Nobunaga at Kanegasaki would be killed by Nobunaga seven years later—an anecdote that tells of the flux of human relationships in the Sengoku period.

Ieyasu’s Agitation — A Withdrawal of Which He Was Not Informed by Nobunaga

For Ieyasu, the Battle of Kanegasaki was his first experience of participating as reinforcements in another daimyō’s war. The young Mikawa daimyō of 29 had joined the expedition to strengthen his alliance with Nobunaga.

According to an article carried in “Rekishijin,” Ieyasu was not informed in advance of the decision to withdraw by Nobunaga, but heard of it from Hideyoshi. The isolated position of not knowing what was being decided in the headquarters of Nobunaga, “who stood in the position of a superior lord,” must have induced considerable agitation in the young Ieyasu.

The “Kan’ei Shoka Keizuden” and “Tokugawa Jikki” write that Ieyasu contributed to the withdrawal by himself firing a gun, but these are secondary sources. To what degree Ieyasu was active is unknown, but at the very least the Kanegasaki experience confronted Ieyasu with the reality that “the alliance with Nobunaga is not one of equals.” In later years—at Mikatagahara, Anegawa, Nagashino, and elsewhere—Ieyasu continued to position the Tokugawa house as “an ally of the Oda,” but the essence of that relationship was already visible at Kanegasaki.

The “Rear Guard” Made Later Rulers of the Realm

The Battle of Kanegasaki became the starting point of Hideyoshi’s greatest tale of advancement. Through the “Taikōki,” the heroic image of “the man who saved Nobunaga as commander of the rear guard” spread, and this supported Hideyoshi’s authority. The image that Tōkichirō, a mere retainer, was a man who could become “ruler of the realm” can be said to have begun from the dramatization of Kanegasaki.

In reality, however, it is highly likely it was a three-man arrangement of Ikeda Katsumasa, Akechi Mitsuhide, and Kinoshita Tōkichirō. Even so, in his later years Hideyoshi himself emphasized this “rear-guard hero tale” and is said to have been involved in the compilation of the “Taikōki.” The stories of history often become legend in divergence from reality, and that legend produces new authority—the Kanegasaki retreat is a good example of this.

Why Did the Asakura Army Not Pursue?

One of the greatest mysteries of the Battle of Kanegasaki is the weakness of the Asakura army’s pursuit. Although they must have known that letting Nobunaga slip away would lead to their own destruction, the Asakura army carried out no aggressive pursuit.

The reasons cited are: (1) that, owing to discord within the Asakura clan, they could not organize a large-scale pursuit force; (2) that Nobunaga’s withdrawal was faster than expected, so they missed the timing for pursuit; and (3) the lack of decisiveness of Asakura Yoshikage. In fact, Yoshikage did not move from his stronghold of Ichijōdani, and sent no reinforcements even to Kagetsune, who fought hard on the front line.

It should be seen that this naivety of judgment led to the fall of the Asakura clan three years later. For Yoshikage, Kanegasaki was “a battle in which he let slip a perfect opportunity.”

Nobunaga’s Subsequent Tenacity — Three Years to the Fall of the Azai and Asakura

From the humiliation of Kanegasaki, it took Nobunaga only three years to completely destroy the Azai and Asakura.

• 4th month, 1570: the Kanegasaki retreat.
• 6th month, 1570: the Battle of Anegawa (defeats the allied Azai-Asakura army).
• 9th month, 1570: the Shiga Campaign (a temporary truce).
• 9th month, 1571: the burning of Mt. Hiei (retaliation for supporting the Azai and Asakura).
• 4th month, 1573: the death of Takeda Shingen; the encirclement of Nobunaga collapses.
• 8th month, 1573: the Battle of Ichijōdani; the fall of the Asakura clan.
• 9th month, 1573: the Battle of Odani Castle; the fall of the Azai clan.

So persistent a war of revenge is rare even in the Sengoku period. For Nobunaga, the humiliation of Kanegasaki was a debt that absolutely had to be repaid in his lifetime.

Battle of Kanegasaki Timeline

Date	Event
1st month, 23rd day, 1570	Nobunaga issues a letter urging the various Sengoku daimyō to come to the capital. Asakura Yoshikage does not respond.
4th month, 20th day	The allied Oda-Tokugawa army of 30,000 sets out from Kyoto, under the pretext of “subjugating Mutō Tomomasu of Wakasa.” Encamps at Sakamoto and Wani.
4th month, 21st day	Lodges at Tanaka Castle in Takashima District.
4th month, 22nd day	Lodges at the residence of Matsumiya Genba at Kumagawa in Wakasa.
4th month, 23rd day	Encamps at Kuniyoshi Castle at Sagaki in Wakasa. The era name changes from “Eiroku” to “Genki.”
4th month, 24th day	Stays at Kuniyoshi Castle.
4th month, 25th day	Advances to Tsuruga in Echizen; attacks and takes Tezutsuyama Castle (taking 1,370 heads).
4th month, 26th day	Forces Kanegasaki Castle and Hikida Castle to open their gates. Asakura Kagetsune surrenders and withdraws.
Around 4th month, 27th–28th	As he is about to cross Kinome Pass, the report of Azai Nagamasa’s defection arrives. Nobunaga at first disbelieves it as “a false report,” then, on subsequent reports, decides to withdraw with “it cannot be helped.”
4th month, 28th day	The withdrawal begins. Kinoshita Tōkichirō, Akechi Mitsuhide, Ikeda Katsumasa, and others are left at Kanegasaki Castle as the rear guard. Ieyasu too remains at the front but retreats with Tōkichirō’s aid.
4th month, 29th day	Kutsuki Mototsuna, persuaded by Matsunaga Hisahide, permits Nobunaga’s passage.
4th month, 30th day	Nobunaga returns to Kyoto by way of the Kutsuki crossing. The “Tamon-in Nikki” gives hearsay of losses of 2,000.
5th month, 4th day	The letter of Isshiki Fujinaga (the “Buke Unsen”). Shows that the rear guard was a three-man arrangement of Kinoshita, Akechi, and Ikeda.
5th month, 6th day	Akechi Mitsuhide and Niwa Nagahide complete the subjugation of Mutō Tomomasu of Wakasa. Mutō surrenders, offering his mother as a hostage.
5th month, 9th day	Nobunaga sets out for his return to Gifu with an army of 20,000.
5th month, 12th day	Heading for Gifu by way of Sekigahara, Nobunaga enters Nagahara Castle in Yasu owing to Rokkaku remnants.
6th month, 28th day	The Battle of Anegawa — Nobunaga counterattacks within two months, defeating the allied Azai-Asakura army.

* Dates are in the old (lunar) calendar. Row shading: orange = combat; red = the withdrawal battle; yellow = post-battle developments.

Battle of Kanegasaki: Relationships of the Key Figures of Both Armies

The Allied Oda-Tokugawa Army (the Shogunal Army)

Role	Person	Movements in This Battle
Supreme commander	Oda Nobunaga	Invaded Echizen with 30,000 and subdued Tsuruga District. On the report of Nagamasa’s defection, decided to withdraw and returned alive to Kyoto via the Kutsuki crossing.
Ally	Tokugawa Ieyasu	Age 29, fought as Nobunaga’s ally. Joined the capture of Tezutsuyama Castle. At the withdrawal, was not informed in advance by Nobunaga and retreated with Tōkichirō’s aid.
Rear guard	Kinoshita Tōkichirō (Toyotomi Hideyoshi)	Remained at Kanegasaki Castle as part of the rear guard. Supported Ieyasu’s retreat. Deified as “commander of the rear guard” in the “Shinchō Kōki” and “Taikōki.”
Rear guard	Akechi Mitsuhide	Was wary of the Azai and Asakura movements in advance (the “Miyake-ke Monjo”). A member of the three-man rear guard (the “Buke Unsen”).
Rear guard	Ikeda Katsumasa	Shugo of Settsu, a member of the three-man rear guard. A commander of higher rank than Tōkichirō, but inconspicuous in later stories.
Diplomacy	Matsunaga Hisahide	Persuaded Kutsuki Mototsuna and secured Nobunaga’s passage. Became his lifesaver, but turned against Nobunaga seven years later.
Oda retainer	Shibata Katsuie	Joined the capture of Tezutsuyama Castle.
Oda retainer	Niwa Nagahide	After the withdrawal, completed the subjugation of Mutō Tomomasu of Wakasa with Akechi Mitsuhide.
Passage cooperation	Kutsuki Mototsuna	A kokujin of Takashima District in Ōmi. At first considered killing Nobunaga, but permitted passage on Matsunaga Hisahide’s persuasion.
Forward base	Awaya Katsuhisa	A chief retainer of the Takeda of Wakasa, lord of Kuniyoshi Castle. Long resisted the Asakura; supported the Oda army’s advance and withdrawal.

The Allied Asakura-Azai Army

Role	Person	Movements in This Battle
Asakura head	Asakura Yoshikage	Did not move from Ichijōdani, sent no reinforcements to Kagetsune. A fatal blunder of letting Nobunaga slip away.
Asakura kinsman	Asakura Kagetsune	Lord of Kanegasaki Castle, Yoshikage’s cousin. Lost his will to fight with Tezutsuyama’s fall and opened the castle in a day. Denounced as “a disgrace to the Asakura name,” retired, and died.
Asakura kinsman	Asakura Kageakira	Said to have deliberately delayed reinforcements to Kagetsune. Three years later, betrayed Yoshikage at the fall of the Asakura.
Asakura kinsman	Asakura Kagetake	Involved in the delay of reinforcements to Kagetsune. Later led the Asakura army at the Battle of Anegawa.
Azai head	Azai Nagamasa	Nobunaga’s brother-in-law, a Sengoku daimyō of northern Ōmi. Suddenly defected to cut off the Oda army’s rear, throwing Nobunaga into the crisis of a pincer.
Azai retired lord	Azai Hisamasa	Nagamasa’s father. Valued the relationship with the Asakura; said to have led the defection of Nagamasa.
Related force	Mutō Tomomasu	A kokujin of Wakasa, leaning toward the Asakura. Became the pretext for the expedition; surrendered on the 6th of the 5th month, offering his mother as a hostage.
Related force	Takeda Motoaki	Shugo of Wakasa, a nephew of Ashikaga Yoshiaki. Confined at Ichijōdani by the Asakura. Said to be one of the true purposes of the expedition.
Related force	Rokkaku Yoshikata	A Sengoku daimyō of southern Ōmi (in retirement). Responding to Nagamasa’s defection, advanced into Ōmi and set fire to Oda territory (the “Tokitsugu Kyōki”).

Related Historic Site Map — Battle of Kanegasaki

Spots on the Map:

• Kanegasaki Castle ruins (Kanegasaki Shrine) (castle) — The stage of Nobunaga’s greatest withdrawal. The castle in which Hideyoshi and the rear guard held out.
• Tezutsuyama Castle ruins (castle) — The first mountain castle the Oda army captured. A fierce battlefield where 1,370 heads were taken.
• Kuniyoshi Castle ruins (Sagaki Kuniyoshi Castle) (castle) — The residence of Awaya Katsuhisa, retainer of the Takeda of Wakasa. The Oda side’s forward base.
• Kumagawa-juku (post town) — A post town on the Wakasa Road through which the Oda army passed during its advance.
• Kutsuki Kōshō-ji (temple / place of tradition) — A temple where the tradition of the Kutsuki crossing remains.
• Kutsuki Jin’ya ruins (historic site) — The stronghold of Kutsuki Mototsuna. The place of the decision whether to let Nobunaga through or kill him.
• Kinome Pass (pass) — The pass at which the Oda army aimed to storm into the interior of Echizen. The place where the report of Nagamasa’s defection was received.
• Shimizudani ruins (Ichijōdani Asakura clan ruins) (historic site) — The Asakura stronghold that was the Oda army’s final objective.

* The map is a reference display based on modern roads. It differs from the roads and terrain of the Sengoku period.

📍 View the route on Google Maps (switchable between car/train)

Related Articles

Battle Articles

• Battle of Okehazama (1560) — Nobunaga’s starting point, ten years before Kanegasaki.
• Battle of Inabayama Castle (1567) — Nobunaga subdues Mino, a step toward the march on the capital.
• Battle of Anegawa (1570) — Nobunaga’s counterattack only two months after the Kanegasaki defeat.
• Battle of Odani Castle (1573) — The fall of the Azai clan, the final settlement of the Kanegasaki humiliation.

Warlord Articles

• Oda Nobunaga — The supreme commander of the withdrawal, whose life was saved.
• Azai Nagamasa — The one who decided on defection, Nobunaga’s brother-in-law.
• Asakura Yoshikage — The naivety of strategic judgment that let Nobunaga slip away.
• Tokugawa Ieyasu — The young ally of 29, in his first participation as reinforcements.
• Toyotomi Hideyoshi — The starting point of his tale of advancement as the rear guard.
• Matsunaga Hisahide — The man who saved Nobunaga’s life with the persuasion at Kutsuki.

References

Primary Sources

• Ōta Gyūichi, “Shinchō Kōki,” vol. 3 — a contemporary record by a Nobunaga retainer. The source of the famous scenes “it must be a false report” and “it cannot be helped.”
• Letter of Isshiki Fujinaga (dated the 4th day of the 5th month of Genki 1, in the “Buke Unsen”) — an important source showing the rear guard was a three-man arrangement of Kinoshita, Akechi, and Ikeda.
• “Mōri-ke Monjo,” memorandum of Oda Nobunaga (dated the 10th day of the 7th month of Genki 1) — Nobunaga’s official explanation giving the expedition’s purpose as “subjugating Mutō”; shows his recognition of Nagamasa’s defection during the withdrawal.
• “Miyake-ke Monjo,” letter of Akechi Mitsuhide (dated the 20th day of the 4th month of Genki 1) — Mitsuhide’s wariness of the Azai and Asakura movements on the very day of departure.
• “Tokitsugu Kyōki” — conveys the Rokkaku’s response to the Azai and their arson.
• “Tamon-in Nikki” — records the losses of the withdrawal (2,000) as hearsay.
• “Ietada Nikki Zōho” — conveys the taking of 1,370 heads at Tezutsuyama Castle.

Secondary Sources (Edo Period Onward)

• “Asakura Kaki” — conveys the bag-of-beans legend and Matsunaga Hisahide’s persuasion of Kutsuki. Caution as to credibility.
• “Asakura-ki” — conveys Kutsuki Mototsuna’s plan to kill Nobunaga.
• “Kuniyoshi Rōjōki” — conveys Nobunaga’s stay at Kuniyoshi Castle.
• “Taikōki” and “Hōan Taikōki” — the origin of the “Hideyoshi rear-guard hero tale.”
• “Kan’ei Shoka Keizuden” and “Tokugawa Jikki” — Tokugawa-historiography sources conveying Ieyasu’s participation in the rear guard.

Major Research Works and Papers

• Taniguchi Katsuhiro, “A Complete Record of Oda Nobunaga’s Battles: From Okehazama to Honnō-ji” (Chūkō Shinsho, 2002).
• Takazawa Hitoshi, “New Shinchō Kōki” — presents the Takeda Motoaki rescue theory and the during-withdrawal recognition theory.
• Hisano Masashi, “On the Military Relationship Between Oda Nobunaga and Ashikaga Yoshiaki,” “Hakusan Shigaku” no. 53, 2017 (collected in “The Power Structure of the Oda Nobunaga Regime,” Ebisu Kōshō Shuppan, 2019).
• Hasegawa Yūko, “Azai Nagamasa and Asakura Yoshikage” (in Higuchi Kunio et al., eds., “Human Images in History: Two Japanese Histories,” Komichi Shobō, 2019).
• Kanda Yuri, “The Marriage with Oichi” (in Owada Tetsuo, ed., “All About Azai Nagamasa,” Shin-Jinbutsu Ōraisha, 2008).
• Ōta Hiroshi, “Azai Nagamasa and the Battle of Anegawa” (Sunrise Shuppan, 2011).
• “History of Fukui Prefecture,” General History vol. 2, Medieval — movements of the Takeda of Wakasa and the Asakura clan.

Public Papers and Commentary

• Watanabe Daimon, “Was It Not Only Hideyoshi? Who Were the True Men of Merit Who Saved Nobunaga at the ‘Kanegasaki Retreat’?” Yahoo! News Expert, 2026.
• Watanabe Daimon, “Was Lady Oichi’s Secret Report Fact? The Truth of the ‘Bag of Beans Legend’ That Told of Her Husband Azai Nagamasa’s Betrayal,” Yahoo! News Expert, 2026.
• Serai.jp, “A New Theory of the Kanegasaki Retreat: The Important Meaning That the Oda Front Line Was the ‘Impregnable Kuniyoshi Castle,'” 2023.

Public Institution Materials

• Tsuruga City official tourism guide (Kanegasaki Castle ruins, Kanegasaki Shrine).
• Wakasa Mikata Goko Tourism Association (Kuniyoshi Castle ruins).
• Fukui Prefectural Ichijōdani Asakura Clan Ruins Museum.

* This article is composed on the basis of the sources, research works, and papers above, as well as multiple information sources on the web. There are points on which interpretations of history differ even among researchers, and established views may change with the discovery of new sources or the advance of research.