The Battle of Nagashino — The Myth of the Three-Rank Volley and the Collapse of the Takeda Army: A Decisive Battle That Overturns the Received View of Sengoku Warfare

5th month, 21st day, Tenshō 3 (June 29, 1575) | Nagashino and Shitaragahara, Shitara District, Mikawa Province (present-day Shinshiro City, Aichi Prefecture)

The Battle of Nagashino in Three Lines

• The allied army of Oda Nobunaga and Tokugawa Ieyasu, 38,000 strong, smashed the army of Takeda Katsuyori, 15,000 strong. Many famed Takeda generals—Yamagata Masakage, Baba Nobuharu, Naitō Masahide, and others—died in battle.
• The received views of “3,000 guns in a three-rank volley” and “the annihilation of the Takeda cavalry corps” are, in recent research, being reexamined in much of their substance.
• The cause of victory was not guns alone, but Nobunaga’s comprehensive strategy: building a fortified camp, Sakai Tadatsugu’s surprise attack on the Tobigasuyama forts, and the sealing of the retreat route.

The Mainstream View — A Textbook-Based Explanation

Background — The Takeda House After Shingen’s Death, and Katsuyori’s Active Policy

On the 12th day of the 4th month of 1573 (Genki 4), Takeda Shingen died of illness in the midst of his westward campaign. The momentum of the Takeda, who had overwhelmed Ieyasu at the Battle of Mikatagahara, was abruptly halted by Shingen’s death. The one who succeeded the Takeda house was Shingen’s fourth son, Takeda Katsuyori, then 29. While keeping his father Shingen’s dying injunction—”conceal my death for three years, and in that time nurture the strength of the domain”—he sought to rebuild the Takeda house’s structure.

Katsuyori was by no means a mediocre daimyō. Rather, he took an active policy surpassing his father. In the 2nd month of 1574 (Tenshō 2), he invaded the Oda territory of Mino Province and in only a month and a half brought down 18 castles, including Akechi Castle and Iibama Castle. Furthermore, in the 6th month he captured the impregnable famed castle of Takatenjin Castle in Tōtōmi. This was a castle that even his father Shingen could not take, and as Nobunaga’s reinforcements did not arrive in time, it was a great shock to Ieyasu.

Under Katsuyori’s rule, the Takeda house’s territory reached its maximum extent. Nobunaga was wary of Katsuyori as “not to be taken lightly,” and later, when he learned of Katsuyori’s death, he is said to have appraised him: “a peerless bowman of Japan, yet when his fortune runs out it comes to this (death)” (the “Mikawa Monogatari”). Because of the image of the great defeat at Nagashino, Katsuyori’s appraisal tends to be seen as low, but his contemporary reputation was by no means low.

The Confrontation Between the Takeda and Tokugawa Over Nagashino Castle

Nagashino Castle was a castle located deep in the mountains of Mikawa Province (eastern Aichi Prefecture), a natural stronghold at the confluence of the Kansa River and the Ōno River. Its lord at the time was Okudaira Sadamasa (later Nobumasa). The Okudaira were originally attached to the Imagawa, and thereafter shifted their allegiance among the Oda, the Tokugawa, and the Takeda—a kokujin of eastern Mikawa.

In the Genki era, the Okudaira had submitted to the Takeda house under the invasion of Takeda Shingen. But when Shingen died in the 4th month of 1573 and that information reached the Okudaira, they turned coat to the Tokugawa. This incurred Takeda Katsuyori’s anger, and for the Takeda house Nagashino Castle became a target for “chastising the traitor.”

Ieyasu highly valued Okudaira Sadamasa’s turning of coat and promised him marriage with his own eldest daughter, Kamehime. Nagashino Castle was made over into an important front-line base for the Tokugawa side, and for Katsuyori it became a castle that absolutely had to be retaken.

The Takeda Army of 15,000 Besieges Nagashino Castle

On the 8th day of the 5th month of 1575 (Tenshō 3), Takeda Katsuyori attacked Nagashino Castle leading a great army of 15,000. The force defending Nagashino Castle was only about 500, but it was equipped with as many as 200 guns and abundant provisions, and with a firm defense making use of the terrain, it weathered the Takeda army’s fierce assault.

To surround Nagashino Castle, the Takeda army built five siege forts in the vicinity: the Tobigasuyama fort (the main fort), the Nakayama fort, the Kumayama fort, the Ubagafutokoro fort, and the Kimigafushido fort. Shingen’s half-brother Takeda Nobuzane, leading about 1,000 troops, watched and surrounded Nagashino Castle from these forts.

The Takeda army attacked the castle many times, but Okudaira Sadamasa repelled them by making use of guns. However, the castle’s provision storehouse was lost to fire, and as food ran short, the castle was driven to the crisis of being on the verge of falling.

Torii Suneemon’s Desperate Request for Relief

On the night of the 14th of the 5th month, Okudaira Sadamasa sent out his retainer Torii Suneemon as a secret messenger. Suneemon was an ashigaru (a sub-retainer) of the Okudaira house, then 36. To request reinforcements from Ieyasu, who was at Okazaki Castle, he had to break through the Takeda army’s encirclement and run.

Suneemon escaped from the castle’s drainage outlet and, diving into the Kansa River, broke through the Takeda army’s watch net. At the Nagabashiri pool there was a contrivance of an alarm net, but he cut the net underwater and went on. On the morning of the 15th he raised a signal fire from Gampōzan to convey his successful escape to Nagashino Castle, and in the afternoon arrived at Okazaki Castle.

At Okazaki Castle, reinforcements of 30,000 led by Nobunaga had already arrived. Combined with Ieyasu’s force of 8,000, a great army of 38,000 was arranged to set out for Nagashino the very next day. On learning this, Suneemon rejoiced greatly and, to convey this good news to Nagashino Castle as soon as possible, immediately turned back.

In the early morning of the 16th of the 5th month, Suneemon again raised a signal fire to convey the coming of the reinforcements, but right before the castle, at Arumi village, he was captured by the Takeda army.

Suneemon’s Crucifixion and Katsuyori’s Bargain

Through interrogation, Katsuyori learned that Suneemon was a messenger of Nagashino Castle and that the Oda-Tokugawa reinforcements were on their way, and he was pressed to take Nagashino Castle before the reinforcements arrived. Katsuyori proposed a bargain to Suneemon: “I will take you before the castle; shout toward it, ‘The reinforcements are not coming. Give up and surrender the castle.’ If you do, I will spare your life and treat you generously as a Takeda retainer.”

Suneemon outwardly accepted this order. But when he was led out before the castle, he shouted the exact opposite at the top of his voice toward it: “In two or three days, reinforcements of tens of thousands will arrive. Hold out until then!” The enraged Katsuyori had Suneemon crucified on the spot and run through with spears. He was 36.

Okudaira Sadamasa and the 500 castle troops within, on Suneemon’s desperate report, were convinced that “relief is near” and their morale was greatly roused. Determined not to let Suneemon’s death be in vain, they endured the Takeda army’s all-out attack through the final two days.

The Arrival of the Allied Oda-Tokugawa Army and the Building of the Fortified Camp

On the 18th of the 5th month, the allied Oda-Tokugawa army of 38,000 arrived at Shitaragahara, about 4 kilometers west of Nagashino Castle. Nobunaga deployed on the west bank of the Rengo River (the Shitaragahara plateau) and came to face the Takeda army on the east bank.

Here the marvel of strategy Nobunaga showed was the building of a “fortified camp.” Making use of the terrain of Shitaragahara, he built a triple horse-barrier palisade, heaped up earthen ramparts, and dug dry moats. This was not so much a field camp as a full-scale defensive position that should almost be called a “mobile castle.” Furthermore, the Rengo River and the muddy paddies in front became a natural moat, and could greatly blunt the mobility of cavalry.

Nobunaga’s aim was clear: to drive the Takeda army into a “situation in which it had no choice but to attack.” The allied army was 38,000 and the Takeda army 15,000, a difference of more than double in strength; but if he made the Takeda army charge the fortified camp head-on, he could smash it one-sidedly with the combination of guns and a defensive position.

Sakai Tadatsugu’s Surprise Attack on the Tobigasuyama Forts (Late Night, 5th Month, 20th Day)

Late on the night of the 20th of the 5th month, Nobunaga played a decisive hand. He ordered Ieyasu’s senior retainer Sakai Tadatsugu to make a surprise attack on the Tobigasuyama group of forts, which surrounded Nagashino Castle to the rear of the Takeda army.

By a famous anecdote handed down in the “Jōzan Kidan,” at a joint war council on the night of the 20th, Tadatsugu proposed this surprise-attack plan, but Nobunaga jeered, “Such petty tricks are not to be used,” and rejected it. However, after the council ended, Nobunaga secretly summoned Tadatsugu, praised him—”your proposal is the most reasonable and best plan”—and ordered him to carry it out at once. That he rejected it at the council was out of fear of leaking information to the Takeda side.

Sakai Tadatsugu selected from the Tokugawa army about 2,000 troops excellent with bow and gun, added Nobunaga’s gun unit of 500 and inspectors such as Kanamori Nagachika, and organized a detachment of about 4,000. Guided by the local Suganuma and others, they crossed the steep Matsuyama Pass and, in the dark of night, advanced sewing their way through the mountainous terrain, marking their path (the “Suganuma Kafu”).

Around 8 a.m. on the 21st of the 5th month, the surprise-attack unit assaulted the Tobigasuyama group of forts from the rear. Takeda Nobuzane and the others who received the surprise attack fought well, but Nobuzane, Saigusa Masasada, and others died, and all five forts fell. The Okudaira force of Nagashino Castle also sortied and caught the Takeda side in a pincer, and Nagashino Castle was relieved. At the same time, the retreat route of the Takeda army’s main force deployed at Shitaragahara was completely cut off.

5th Month, 21st Day — The Opening of the Main Battle at Shitaragahara

In the early morning of that same 21st of the 5th month (around 6 a.m.), at Shitaragahara, the Takeda army began its attack. Why did Katsuyori choose a frontal attack against the disadvantageous fortified camp? Katsuyori believed information that the Oda senior retainer Sakuma Nobumori would defect to him (in fact it was Nobunaga’s stratagem). And, his retreat route having been cut off by the fall of the Tobigasuyama forts, he judged that there was no way out but to break through Shitaragahara.

The Takeda army took an attacking formation with both left and right wings as its main strength. The right wing was Yamagata Masakage’s unit, the left wing Naitō Masahide’s unit, and the center Takeda Katsuyori’s main force. As the vanguard, Yamagata, Obata, Takeda Nobutoyo, Baba Nobuharu, and others mounted the charge.

But what awaited the Takeda army was the allied army’s position, equipped with the triple horse-barrier palisade, dry moats, and a great number of guns. Even when the Takeda army’s elite attacked, the palisade prevented the charge of the cavalry, and the dry moats halted the feet of the infantry. In the meantime, guns were fired mercilessly from inside the palisade—the very power of a fortified camp that realized, in a field battle, “a defense equal to a castle siege.”

Eight Hours of Fierce Battle and the Collapse of the Takeda Army

The fighting extended over eight hours. The Takeda army boldly continued to attack, but could not break through the horse-barrier palisade, and only its losses mounted. The ground was muddy from the rain up to the previous day, and the cavalry’s mobility was greatly blunted. Furthermore, Nobunaga rotated his troops at key points, and, conserving his gun units, brought it to a war of endurance.

The situation became decisive when the clansmen who bore the center of the Takeda army—Anayama Nobukimi (Baisetsu), Takeda Nobukado, and others—began to withdraw. With the movement of the clansmen who began to retreat on their own without waiting for Katsuyori’s order, the organized offensive of the Takeda army collapsed. Damage concentrated on both wings, and the famed generals the Takeda prided themselves on died in battle one after another—Yamagata Masakage, Baba Nobuharu, Naitō Masahide, Tsuchiya Masatsugu, Sanada Nobutsuna, Sanada Masateru, Hara Masatane, Tsuchiya Naonori, Annaka Kageshige, Wada Narishige, Yonekura Shigetsugu, Yokota Yasukage…

Past midday, Katsuyori at last decided on retreat. The Takeda army fled in defeat, producing more than 10,000 casualties (including the fighting at the Tobigasuyama forts). The dead of the allied Oda-Tokugawa army are said to have been several thousand.

After the Battle — The Decline of the Takeda Clan and the Glory of the Lord of Nagashino Castle

The Battle of Nagashino was a fatal blow for the Takeda clan. Losing at one stroke many senior-retainer-class veterans from the time of his father Shingen, the Takeda house’s military strength and powers of control were decisively weakened. Katsuyori himself survived, but the prestige of the house fell to the ground, and even the recovery of the Tokugawa territory became impossible. Seven years were required until the destruction of the Takeda clan at the Battle of Tenmokuzan in 1582; but had it not been for the deaths of so many famed generals at Nagashino, it is highly likely the history of the Takeda clan would have continued a little longer.

On the other hand, the lord of Nagashino Castle, Okudaira Sadamasa, by this military feat received a character from Nobunaga’s name and changed his name to “Nobumasa,” and took Ieyasu’s eldest daughter Kamehime as his principal wife. He was granted Ieyasu’s famed sword “Daihannya Nagamitsu” and given a warrant guaranteeing his fief to his descendants for generations. The Okudaira-Matsudaira house, with Sadamasa (Nobumasa) as its ancestor, became a distinguished house continuing until the Meiji era.

Torii Suneemon left his name as an eternal loyal retainer within the Tokugawa and Okudaira houses. His descendants were treated generously within the Okudaira-Matsudaira house, and his son Nobuaki performed military feats at the Battle of Sekigahara. The Tokugawa retainer Ochiai Saheiji made a back-banner depicting the crucified figure of Suneemon and used it in battle. Suneemon’s name was handed down throughout the Edo period as “a symbol of loyalty,” and is taken up in many works to the present day.

Multiple Theories — Exploring Possibilities from Various Angles

Theory 1: Is the “Three-Rank Volley” Historical Fact?

What made the Battle of Nagashino world-famous is the tactic of the “three-rank volley.” Gunners are arranged in three lines; when the first line fires, it falls back to the rearmost to reload, and in the meantime the second line advances and fires—by repeating this, continuous fire was made possible. Such is the received view. It has been recorded even in textbooks as Nobunaga’s stroke of genius. But in recent years this received view has completely wavered.

The only source is Hoan’s “Shinchō-ki”

The description of the “three-rank volley” first appears in Oze Hoan’s “Shinchō-ki” (Hoan’s “Shinchō-ki,” compiled in 1611), nearly 30 years after the Battle of Nagashino. To paraphrase its content: a thousand guns at a time were to be fired, each rank taking turns, one after another, firing in relays.

— Source: Oze Hoan, “Shinchō-ki” (1611)

This has been taken as the source of the three-rank volley, “dividing 3,000 guns into three lines and firing 1,000 at a time in turn.” But the reliable contemporary source “Shinchō Kōki” (by Ōta Gyūichi) has no mention whatsoever of a three-rank volley. The Takeda-side war chronicle “Kōyō Gunkan” too has no such description. Furthermore, nowhere in the 8 extant “Nagashino Battle Screens” is there any depiction of a three-rank volley.

The negative arguments of Fujimoto Masayuki and Suzuki Masaya

The historians Fujimoto Masayuki and Suzuki Masaya have, in works such as “Nobunaga’s Wars” and “Guns and the Japanese,” developed arguments denying the three-rank volley. The main points are as follows:

• A three-rank volley requires the highly controlled action of a gun unit, but the Oda army’s gun unit was hurriedly organized by gathering the guns and gunners separately held by Nobunaga’s retainers, and is thought to have had no prior training.
• There is no description or depiction of a three-rank volley in the Nagashino Battle Screens or in contemporary sources.
• For an event called “a world-historical tactical revolution,” the documentary evidence is decisively insufficient.
• Hoan’s “Shinchō-ki” strongly bears the character of a literary work, and its historicity is inferior.

From these points, Fujimoto and Suzuki concluded that “the three-rank volley is an invention.”

Hirayama Yū’s rebuttal (the “three ranks = three places” theory)

Against this, the foremost authority on Takeda studies, Hirayama Yū, develops an important rebuttal in “The Japanese History of the Defeated 9: The Battle of Nagashino and Takeda Katsuyori” (Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 2014).

According to Hirayama, the “three ranks” (sandan) of Hoan’s “Shinchō-ki” means not “deploying officers and men in lines” but “deploying units in their proper places.” In other words, “three ranks” means “having placed the gun units in three locations,” and to read it as “arranging them in three lines” is a clear misunderstanding and misreading.

On that basis, Hirayama infers that the Oda army’s gunners, more than 3,000, were divided into three units and deployed in three places (this is the original meaning of “three ranks”), and that within each unit they carried out rotating fire. As for the method of rotating fire too, he considers that the gunners arranged in three lines may have, without moving their positions, stood up and fired in turn on the spot.

In other words, Hirayama’s view is that the broad framework of “3,000 guns,” “rotating fire,” and “deployment in three places” is close to historical fact, but the theatrical three-rank volley of “orderly arranging in three lines and exchanging front and rear” did not exist.

The modern organization regarding the “three-rank volley”

To summarize the leading interpretation among current researchers:

• The “three-rank volley of orderly arranging in three lines and exchanging front and rear” is highly likely an invention.
• However, it is highly likely that rotating fire in the form of dispersing the guns into about three places and, at each place, “firing as each man is ready” was carried out.
• The efficiency of continuous fire was not as high as a “three-line, three-rank volley,” but in a war of endurance protected by the horse-barrier palisade, it could sufficiently halt the Takeda army.

The essence of the gun tactics at Nagashino was not the dramatic revolution of “the world’s first three-rank volley,” but a part of the comprehensive strategy of “fortified camp + guns + sealing the retreat route”—this is the cool appraisal. There was no single decisive factor called the “three-rank volley”; rather, several elements combined to defeat the Takeda army.

Theory 2: Did the “Takeda Cavalry Corps” Really Exist?

The received view of the Battle of Nagashino that stands alongside the “three-rank volley” is the existence of the “Takeda cavalry corps.” The image that the strongest Takeda cavalry corps was blocked by the horse-barrier palisade, shot by guns, and annihilated has been told as a typical example of a Sengoku-period battle. But this received view too has, in recent years, greatly wavered.

Japanese horses were small

The Japanese horses of the Sengoku period (native horses) were small horses of about 120–140 centimeters at the withers, not large horses like the modern thoroughbred. Native horses such as the Kiso horse and the Nanbu horse are, by the modern sense, close to “ponies.” Like the myth of the three-rank volley, to imagine the Takeda cavalry corps with the image of “Western heavily armored cavalry charging while swinging swords” is fundamentally mistaken.

The history researcher Suzuki Masaya, in “The Great Misunderstandings of the Sengoku Period” (PHP Institute), “Cavalry vs. Guns: The Battle of Nagashino,” raised doubt about the very concept of a “cavalry corps” in Japanese Sengoku battles. Japanese horses had a strong character as pack horses for carrying loads, and a form of combat in which cavalry was the main force did not originally develop—this is Suzuki’s argument.

Hirayama Yū’s research — there were mounted warriors, but not a “cavalry corps”

The foremost authority on Takeda studies, Hirayama Yū, presents a more precise analysis in “Did the Takeda Cavalry Corps Really Exist?” (“Rekishijin,” September 2017 issue) and elsewhere. According to Hirayama:

• The Takeda clan certainly had many warriors who owned horses (Kai and Shinano were horse-producing regions).
• But it is hard to think there was an independent unit organization as a “cavalry corps.”
• In Sengoku-period combat, mounted warriors rode horses as commanders of infantry bearing spears and bows, but in battle the basic practice was to dismount and fight.
• The style of “mounted warriors charging in a dense formation” scarcely existed in Sengoku-period Japan.

In other words, Hirayama’s conclusion is that the Takeda army had many mounted warriors, but a unit in the sense of a “Western-style heavily armored cavalry corps” did not exist.

Where did the “Takeda cavalry corps” image come from?

Then why did the image of the “Takeda cavalry corps” spread so far? One reason is the exaggeration of Edo-period military-science texts and war chronicles. Takeda Shingen’s tactics were idealized in Edo-period military science as the “Takeda school,” and in that current the image of “Takeda, the famous horse-producing region; the Takeda cavalry corps is the strongest” was created.

Another is the influence of modern historical novels, films, and historical dramas. The visually impactful “charge scene of a cavalry corps” has been repeatedly reproduced in dramas and films. The cavalry-corps charge in the last scene of director Kurosawa Akira’s “Kagemusha” (1980) fixed the postwar Japanese image of the “Takeda cavalry corps.” But cinematic staging and historical fact are separate things.

The examination of the Nagashino Battle Screen

In the extant Nagashino Battle Screens, the figures of mounted warriors are depicted among the Takeda army heading for the horse-barrier palisade. But it is not that all are charging in a dense mounted mass; the reality is that the mounted warriors are depicted as commanders leading infantry. The configuration of “the strongest Takeda cavalry corps charging all at once and being shot by guns and annihilated” should reasonably be considered a “narrativized scene” different from the historical-fact combat.

The true strength of the Takeda — disciplined infantry forces

The true strength of the Takeda army was not a cavalry corps but the “powers of control over the retainer band,” the “coordination of infantry and cavalry as one body,” and the “experienced layer of commanders” that Shingen had built up. The veteran senior generals—Yamagata Masakage, Baba Nobuharu, Naitō Masahide, and others—were masters of unit command rather than masters of horsemanship. Their deaths were the true blow to the Takeda house.

The essence of the Battle of Nagashino lies not in a simple weapons duel of “guns vs. cavalry,” but in the configuration whereby the allied army’s comprehensive strategy of “fortified camp + guns + sealing the retreat route” annihilated, at one stroke, the Takeda army’s layer of veteran commanders. To understand the more complex reality of the combat, apart from the dramatic image of “the Takeda cavalry corps annihilated by guns,” is the point reached by modern research.

Theory 3: Were There Really 3,000 Guns?

“3,000 guns” too is widely known as a symbolic figure of the Battle of Nagashino. It is the image that Nobunaga prepared an unusually large number of guns for the time. But this figure too differs by source.

The 3,000-gun theory of Hoan’s “Shinchō-ki”

The source of “3,000 guns” is, like the three-rank volley, Hoan’s “Shinchō-ki” (compiled in 1611). It has the descriptions “3,000 guns” and “firing 1,000 at a time,” and these have been taken as the basis of the 3,000-gun theory.

But Hoan’s “Shinchō-ki” is a book containing literary exaggeration rather than historical fact, and there are problems with its reliability. Compiled more than 30 years after the Battle of Nagashino, it is a compilation from a time when the memory of the participants had also faded.

The 1,000-gun theory of the “Shinchō Kōki”

The “Shinchō Kōki,” written by Nobunaga’s retainer Ōta Gyūichi, is a reliable contemporary source. In it, it is recorded as “about 1,000 guns.” This is one-third the figure of Hoan’s “Shinchō-ki.”

Some manuscript copies of the “Shinchō Kōki” are written as “3,000 guns,” but this is highly likely a later rewriting under the influence of Hoan’s “Shinchō-ki.” The oldest manuscript has “1,000 guns,” and this is the reliable interpretation.

Fujimoto Masayuki’s examination

The historian Fujimoto Masayuki, in his 1975 paper “On the Number of the Oda Gun Corps at the Battle of Nagashino” (“Kacchū Bugu Kenkyū,” no. 35), estimated the number of guns in Nobunaga’s army at about 1,500. Fujimoto’s grounds are as follows:

• On the previous day (5th month, 20th), Nobunaga received support of guns, gunpowder, and gunners (shooters) from Nagaoka Fujitaka (Hosokawa Fujitaka).
• 500 guns (2 units) were allotted to the attack on the Tobigasuyama forts.
• The gun units of the main battle at Shitaragahara were 5 units; at 250 guns per unit, 5 units make 1,250 guns.
• In total, about 1,750 guns—500 for the Tokugawa army and 1,250 for the Oda army—is realistic.

Examination of the practical side

There is also the calculation that “if 3,000 gun ashigaru were arranged in a single line, even at 1-meter intervals, 3 kilometers would be needed.” The length of the horse-barrier palisade is said to be about 2 kilometers, and to arrange 3,000 guns all at once is physically difficult. If arranged in groups of three, it would fit into 1 kilometer at 1-meter intervals, but even so, to operate all the guns at once is unrealistic.

Therefore, many current researchers see “3,000” as literary exaggeration and estimate the actual number at about 1,500–2,000. Even so, it was an extraordinary number of guns for a Sengoku battle of the time, and is without doubt proof of Nobunaga’s economic power and organizational ability.

Nobunaga’s gun-procurement routes

Behind Nobunaga’s being able to gather so many guns was the fact that he held the two great gun-production centers of Sakai and Kunitomo under his direct control. Sakai boasted the foremost economic power in the country as a commercial city, and Nobunaga had secured the procurement routes for gun shot and gunpowder. Kunitomo village in Ōmi Province (present-day Kunitomo-chō, Nagahama City, Shiga Prefecture) developed as a great gun-production center alongside Sakai and supplied large quantities to Nobunaga on favorable terms.

In other words, the guns of the Battle of Nagashino were the result of Nobunaga’s economic and industrial strategy. Even if the dramatic figure of “the three-rank volley of 3,000 guns” is an embellishment, that Nobunaga’s gun-operation ability greatly surpassed that of the other Sengoku daimyō is certain as historical fact.

Theory 4: Why Did Takeda Katsuyori Choose a Reckless Decisive Battle?

One of the greatest mysteries of the Battle of Nagashino is Katsuyori’s judgment to give decisive battle. The allied army was 38,000, the Takeda army 15,000—a difference of more than double in strength, and the allied army had built a fortified camp. Had Katsuyori chosen to withdraw, it is highly likely the great defeat at Shitaragahara could have been avoided. Even so, Katsuyori chose decisive battle. Why?

(1) The success experience of capturing Takatenjin Castle

In the 6th month of the previous year, 1574 (Tenshō 2), Katsuyori brought down the impregnable famed castle of Takatenjin Castle in Tōtōmi. It was a castle even his father Shingen could not take. Ieyasu was shocked at Hamamatsu Castle, and Nobunaga’s reinforcements did not arrive in time. This success experience highly likely gave Katsuyori the confidence that “I can win the next decisive battle too.”

The theory that psychological factors—wanting to surpass his father Shingen, wanting to establish his own position within the Takeda house—influenced Katsuyori’s judgment has long been deep-rooted.

(2) The false-defection information of Sakuma Nobumori (Nobunaga’s stratagem)

The “Buke Jiki” and “Jōzan Kidan” contain an anecdote that the Oda senior retainer Sakuma Nobumori had promised Katsuyori an inside response. In fact it was Nobunaga’s stratagem, and Nobumori was playing a “false defection” to lure Katsuyori into a decisive battle. Katsuyori believed this information and judged that “if I give decisive battle, I can win through the inside response.”

In the “Jōzan Kidan,” Nobumori promised an inside response to Nagasaka Mitsukata (Katsuyori’s close aide), and Mitsukata urged Katsuyori to decisive battle. Rejecting the withdrawal argument of Baba Nobuharu and others, Katsuyori chose decisive battle.

The truth of this theory is unknown, but considering the high level of Nobunaga’s stratagem ability, the possibility that some disruptive information was sent into the Takeda camp is fully conceivable. One can also read it not as Katsuyori’s misjudgment but as Nobunaga’s strategic victory.

(3) The pro-war argument of close aides such as Atobe Katsusuke

In the “Kōyō Gunkan,” it is said that Katsuyori’s close aides Atobe Katsusuke, Nagasaka Mitsukata, and others strongly insisted on the pro-war argument and ignored the opinion of veteran senior retainers such as Baba Nobuharu and Yamagata Masakage that “we should withdraw.” This is a description in line with the “Kōyō Gunkan’s” configuration that in Katsuyori’s time there was a conflict between the newly risen layer of close aides and the layer of old senior retainers.

By historians’ examination, it is confirmed in documents that Atobe Katsusuke was relied upon as a close aide from Shingen’s time through Katsuyori’s time, and the conflict between the newly risen close-aide layer and the old senior-retainer layer is highly likely not a mere invention of war chronicles but a reflection of a structural problem within the Takeda house.

(4) Nobunaga’s retreat-sealing strategy

According to a commentary carried in “Rekishi Kaidō,” Nobunaga’s strategic pressure was decisive in Katsuyori’s judgment. While the allied army did not try to move from Shitaragahara and was building the fortified camp, Sakai Tadatsugu’s detachment of 4,000 made a surprise attack on the Tobigasuyama group of forts. By this, the Takeda army’s retreat route was cut off.

Once the retreat route was cut, the Takeda army’s options were limited to “break through Shitaragahara and withdraw” or “fight until annihilation.” There was no road of last-ditch revival but to crush the allied army in front—the realistic interpretation is that Katsuyori had no choice but to order the charge.

(5) The juncture of three years after Shingen’s death

As another factor, there is the point that three years had passed since Shingen’s death and the deadline of Shingen’s dying injunction “conceal my death for three years” was approaching. A strategy relying on Shingen’s authority was reaching its limit, and Katsuyori was pressed to show his own ability. Had he withdrawn, the prestige of the house would have fallen and there was a danger of inviting the desertion of the retainer band.

To summarize these factors, Katsuyori’s decision can be understood not as “reckless emotionalism” but as “a bitter choice resulting from the compounding of several factors.” It tends to be criticized by later ages as “a reckless charge,” but the current leading appraisal is that, in the situation of the time, there was a structure in which it was hard to take other options.

Theory 5: Was Sakai Tadatsugu’s Surprise Attack on the Tobigasuyama Forts the Decisive Blow?

Another thing valued as a cause of victory at the Battle of Nagashino is Sakai Tadatsugu’s surprise attack on the Tobigasuyama forts. That he made a surprise attack on the rear of the Takeda army, rather than a frontal decisive battle across the Rengo River, is said to have driven Katsuyori into “no option but to break through Shitaragahara.” Was this surprise attack really the decisive blow, and is its course historical fact?

The “rejection at the council → secret order” anecdote of the “Jōzan Kidan”

By a famous story handed down in the Edo-period anecdote collection “Jōzan Kidan,” at the joint war council on the night of the 20th of the 5th month, Sakai Tadatsugu proposed the Tobigasuyama surprise attack, but Nobunaga jeered “such petty tricks are not to be used” and rejected it. However, after the council ended, Nobunaga secretly summoned Tadatsugu, praised him—”your proposal is the most reasonable and best plan”—and ordered him to carry out the operation at once. That he rejected it at the council was out of fear that the operation information would leak to the Takeda side—a dramatic anecdote.

This anecdote has been repeatedly cited in Sengoku history as a story praising the marvel of Nobunaga’s psychological warfare and Tadatsugu’s wisdom. For the military feat at Nagashino, Nobunaga gave Tadatsugu a “tachi signed Sanemitsu” (later a National Treasure), and the greatness of Tadatsugu’s contribution is without doubt.

The credibility of the anecdote

But the “Jōzan Kidan” is an Edo-period anecdote collection, and strongly bears the character of a “didactic story” rather than historical fact itself. The “Shinchō Kōki” records the fact of Sakai Tadatsugu’s surprise attack, but does not record the anecdote of the rejection at the council and the secret order.

According to Hirayama Yū’s “Tokugawa Ieyasu and Takeda Katsuyori” (KADOKAWA, Kadokawa Sensho 664), it is said that the order to Sakai Tadatsugu to make the surprise attack was the result of consultation between Nobunaga and Ieyasu, and that the drama of rejection at the council is highly likely a later embellishment. The development in which Nobunaga “rejected it at the council but secretly ordered it after the council ended” was a narrative device emphasizing the marvel of Nobunaga’s psychological warfare—such is the view of Hirayama and others.

The strategic significance of the surprise attack

Whatever the truth of the anecdote, the strategic significance of the Tobigasuyama surprise attack itself was extremely great.

First, by the relief of Nagashino Castle, the allied army accomplished its original objective of “relieving Nagashino Castle.” By this, even if it brought the situation to a war of endurance at Shitaragahara, it was strategically already winning.

Second, the Takeda army’s retreat route was cut off. To withdraw east from Nagashino, the Takeda army had to pass through the Tobigasuyama group of forts. Once those forts had fallen and been occupied by the allied army, the Takeda army lost its retreat route.

Third, the Okudaira force that sortied from Nagashino Castle mopped up the Takeda supporting force stationed at Arumi village. By this, the Takeda army of the main battle at Shitaragahara came to have both its rear and its retreat route threatened.

These strategic effects drove Katsuyori into the decisive battle at Shitaragahara. Had it not been for the Tobigasuyama surprise attack, it is highly likely Katsuyori would have chosen to withdraw. In that sense, Sakai Tadatsugu’s surprise attack can be said to have been “another main battlefield” that decided the outcome of the main battle at Shitaragahara.

The composition and casualties of the surprise-attack unit

Sakai Tadatsugu’s detachment was about 4,000. It was a mixed unit including 2,000 elite bow-and-gun troops of the Tokugawa army, Nobunaga’s gun unit of 500, and inspectors such as Kanamori Nagachika. Guided by the local Suganuma and others, they crossed the steep Matsuyama Pass and advanced at night, sewing their way through the mountainous terrain.

Around 8 a.m. on the 21st, the surprise-attack unit, assaulting the Tobigasuyama group of forts from the rear, killed Takeda Nobuzane (Shingen’s half-brother), Saigusa Masasada, Waki Zenbee, and others, and brought down all five forts. At the same time, the Okudaira force that sortied from Nagashino Castle also took part, and the Takeda group of siege forts was completely destroyed.

There were casualties in the surprise-attack unit as well. Fukōzu Matsudaira Koretada (the father of Matsudaira Ietada) died in battle, and the Tokugawa side’s losses too were great. But the strategic result outweighed the casualties.

In conclusion, Sakai Tadatsugu’s surprise attack on the Tobigasuyama forts was a decisive operation forming the core of the cause of victory at the Battle of Nagashino. Rather than the “three-rank volley,” this surprise attack was the true key to the allied victory—this is the appraisal of recent years.

Theory 6: The Crucifixion Legend of Torii Suneemon — Historical Fact or Embellishment?

Another symbolic figure of the Battle of Nagashino is the Okudaira-house ashigaru Torii Suneemon. He succeeded in a desperate request for relief to save Nagashino Castle, and even when captured he shouted “the reinforcements are coming” and was crucified—this story is widely known as a symbol of “loyalty” in the Sengoku period. But the historicity of this anecdote too needs examination.

Suneemon’s existence is certain

That Torii Suneemon was a real person is certain. His detailed image has been clarified in recent research, such as the historian Kaneko Hiraku’s “Torii Suneemon” (Heibonsha). He was born in 1540 (Tenbun 9) within Hoi District, Mikawa Province (present-day Ichida-chō, Toyokawa City, Aichi Prefecture), and was 36 at the time of the Battle of Nagashino. He was active as a sub-retainer of the Okudaira house, and appeared on the front stage of history at the Battle of Nagashino.

After Suneemon’s execution, his descendants were treated generously within the Okudaira-Matsudaira house for generations. His son Nobuaki performed military feats at the Battle of Sekigahara, and from his grandson onward they served the Matsudaira house calling themselves “Suneemon” for generations. The 13th-generation Torii Shōji became a karō (chief retainer). The lineage continues to this day.

The truth of the moment he shouted “the reinforcements are coming”

The famous scene in which Suneemon shouted “the reinforcements are coming” before the cross is recorded in Tokugawa-side sources such as the “Revised and Expanded Nagashino Diary (Nagashino Senki).” It has been handed down as a “tale of a loyal retainer” from the Tokugawa-side viewpoint.

The Takeda-side contemporary sources do not record the details of the scene of Suneemon’s crucifixion, and there is a large part that relies on Tokugawa-side tradition. The possibility that embellishment or emphasis has been added cannot be denied.

However, that Suneemon was captured and crucified itself is taken as fact. The Tokugawa retainer Ochiai Saheiji (Michitsugu), hearing of Suneemon’s conduct and end from a member of the Okudaira house, was deeply moved, made a banner depicting Suneemon’s crucified figure, and used it in battle. This banner is extant, and shows that Suneemon’s crucifixion had already become a legend in the contemporary period.

The Edo-period interpretation of the concept of “loyal retainer”

In the commentary of “Waraku web,” doubt is presented about simply grasping Suneemon as a “loyal retainer.” Under the Confucian values of the Edo period, Suneemon was idealized as “a symbol of loyalty,” but to grasp Suneemon’s Sengoku-period conduct only by Confucian “loyalty” is not appropriate.

The lord-retainer relationship of the Sengoku period was not the Confucian “absolute loyalty” but something more mutual and realistic. What Suneemon had was highly likely not “the concept of loyalty” but a human impulse of “as a person, being unable not to do it.” To stake one’s life to save one’s comrades of Nagashino Castle—this conduct was a decision based on a blood-warm bond between human beings, rather than abstract loyalty—this is the modern understanding.

The role Suneemon’s story played

Suneemon’s story highly likely actually influenced the outcome of the Battle of Nagashino. By his death by crucifixion, the morale of Nagashino Castle was roused, and the castle troops endured the final two days. Because Nagashino Castle did not fall, the Takeda army, without achieving its original objective (the capture of Nagashino Castle), was forced into the decisive battle at Shitaragahara.

Within Sengoku battle research, there is also the view that “because it could not take Nagashino Castle, the Takeda army could not avoid the battle with the Oda-Tokugawa army.” If this is fact, Suneemon is positioned as a figure who made an indirectly decisive contribution to the Oda-Tokugawa victory.

Nobunaga’s response

It is handed down that Nobunaga, on learning of Suneemon’s end, was moved by his loyalty and had a fine grave erected (Kaneko Hiraku, “Torii Suneemon”). Nobunaga’s act of praising the death of an enemy ashigaru shows the greatness of the contemporary impact of Suneemon’s story.

The details of the crucifixion legend itself may have embellishment, but that Suneemon existed as a symbolic figure of the Battle of Nagashino and that his death was already widely known in the contemporary period is certain. In considering what a “hero” of the Sengoku period is, Suneemon’s story holds a universality that does not fade even today.

Viewed Strategically

Viewing the Battle of Nagashino from the standpoint of strategy, two axes emerge: Nobunaga’s “comprehensive strategy” and Katsuyori’s “structural plight.”

First, the completeness of Nobunaga’s comprehensive strategy. Nobunaga’s strategy at Nagashino was not a mere “mass operation of guns,” but a highly integrated operation combining several elements.

• Building a fortified camp: a “mobile castle” with a triple horse-barrier palisade, earthen ramparts, and dry moats. It changed a field battle into the configuration of a castle siege.
• Concentrated deployment of guns: 1,500–2,000 guns dispersed in three places. Rotating fire made a war of attrition possible.
• Sealing the retreat route: the surprise attack on the Tobigasuyama group of forts by Sakai Tadatsugu’s detachment of 4,000. It cut off the Takeda army’s retreat route.
• Stratagem: luring Katsuyori into decisive battle with the false-defection information of Sakuma Nobumori.
• War of endurance: a strategy of holing up in the fortified camp and wearing down the Takeda army’s attacks.

These elements are effective even singly, but by combining they drove the Takeda army into a “situation in which it had no choice but to attack,” and moreover created a structure in which the attack could not succeed. Nobunaga’s strategy had reached the domain of a “comprehensive operation” beyond the frame of a Sengoku-period field battle.

Second, Katsuyori’s structural plight. Katsuyori’s decision to give decisive battle is often criticized by later ages as “reckless,” but in the situation of the time there was a structure in which it was hard to take other options.

Had Katsuyori chosen to withdraw, there was a danger that (1) he would retreat without having taken Nagashino Castle, and the Takeda house’s prestige would fall; (2) the conflict between the senior-retainer layer and the close-aide layer within the house would surface; and (3) the losses would expand under the pursuit of Nobunaga and Ieyasu. On the other hand, had he chosen decisive battle, he could expect (1) the possibility of a military result surpassing Shingen, (2) the judgment that there were prospects of victory if he believed the false-defection information of Sakuma Nobumori, and (3) the effect of unifying the pro-war argument within the house.

As a result, Katsuyori’s judgment ended in failure, but it can be said to be because Nobunaga’s comprehensive strategy surpassed the understanding of the Sengoku daimyō of the time, rather than a mistake of tactical judgment. Even the Takeda house’s veteran senior generals—Yamagata Masakage, Baba Nobuharu, Naitō Masahide, and others—while insisting on withdrawal, could not completely see through the compound strategy of fortified camp + guns + sealing the retreat route. Katsuyori’s tragedy can be said to have been the limit of the strategic vision of the whole Takeda house, rather than his personal misjudgment.

Third, the generational conflict within the Takeda house. The conflict that the “Kōyō Gunkan” records, between the newly risen close-aide layer of Atobe Katsusuke, Nagasaka Mitsukata, and others, and the old senior-retainer layer of Baba Nobuharu, Yamagata Masakage, and others, shows a structural problem of the Takeda house. The senior-retainer layer formed in Shingen’s time was a conservative faction that inherited Shingen’s strategy. On the other hand, the close-aide layer that rose in Katsuyori’s time promoted an active policy in line with Katsuyori’s personal will.

This conflict made Katsuyori’s decision unstable. To choose withdrawal would be to become subordinate to the senior-retainer layer, thinning Katsuyori’s own distinctiveness. To choose decisive battle would gain the support of the close-aide layer but invite the reaction of the senior-retainer layer. Caught between the two, Katsuyori in the end chose decisive battle. This is a structural problem common to the succession period of a Sengoku daimyō, and Katsuyori’s tragedy was not unique to the Takeda house.

Fourth, the long-term influence of the Battle of Nagashino. The deaths of many of the Takeda clan’s famed generals destroyed the Takeda house’s military and organizational foundation. The Takeda clan after Nagashino came to suffer from a lack of personnel that Katsuyori’s powers of command could not make up for. The desertion of Anayama Nobukimi (Baisetsu) and Kiso Yoshimasa (1582), the erosion of the Takeda territory by the Tokugawa and Hōjō, and the destruction of the Takeda clan at the Battle of Tenmokuzan (3rd month, 1582)—the remote cause of all these is to be found in the deaths of many famed generals at Nagashino.

As Watanabe Daimon too points out, the destruction of the Takeda clan was seven years after Nagashino. Nagashino was not a decisive battle of annihilation, but it became the starting point of the Takeda clan’s decline. It is not that “victory = immediate annihilation,” but the strategic effect of “victory weakening the enemy over the long term” was splendidly demonstrated at the Battle of Nagashino.

Fifth, the influence on the relationship between Nobunaga and Ieyasu. The Battle of Nagashino was, for Ieyasu, a revenge battle wiping away the humiliation of the Battle of Mikatagahara. Ieyasu treated the Okudaira generously, praised the military feat of Sakai Tadatsugu, and strengthened the solidarity of the Mikawa retainer band. At the same time, he confirmed the strengthening of the alliance with Nobunaga and firmed up the bond of the Oda-Tokugawa coalition.

It can also be said that the true victor of the Battle of Nagashino was the alliance of Nobunaga and Ieyasu itself. The two could not defeat the Takeda alone, but by allying they smashed the Takeda army, vaunted as the strongest of the Sengoku period. This alliance relationship did not waver until Nobunaga’s Honnō-ji Incident (1582) and would become the foundation of Ieyasu’s seizure of the realm.

Finally, to organize the historical positioning of the Battle of Nagashino: this battle holds multilayered significance—(1) a revolution of the Sengoku-period field battle, the comprehensive strategy of fortified camp + guns + stratagem; (2) the starting point of the Takeda clan’s decline; (3) a great step toward Nobunaga’s unification of the realm; (4) the source of many myths such as the “three-rank volley” and the “Takeda cavalry corps.”

And what recent research has made clear is that the true image of the Battle of Nagashino was far more complex and many-sided than the later story. It was not the simple configuration of “guns defeated cavalry,” but a comprehensive war combining several strategic elements. For us today, who wish to simplify history, the Battle of Nagashino is a precious subject that teaches the importance of “accepting complexity.”

Famous Words and Sayings of This Battle

“In two or three days, reinforcements of tens of thousands will arrive. Hold out until then.”

(traditionally Torii Suneemon, his final cry at the cross)

The words Torii Suneemon, crucified before Nagashino Castle, shouted toward the castle in defiance of Takeda Katsuyori’s order. Katsuyori had intended to make him say “the reinforcements are not coming; surrender the castle,” but Suneemon conveyed the exact opposite fact. He was run through with spears on the spot by the enraged Katsuyori, but the morale within the castle was roused, and they held the castle through the two days until the reinforcements arrived. As a famous saying symbolizing “loyalty” in the Sengoku period, it is widely handed down to the present day.

— “Revised and Expanded Nagashino Diary (Nagashino Senki)” and others

“Such petty tricks are not to be used.”

(traditionally Oda Nobunaga, when rejecting Sakai Tadatsugu’s surprise-attack plan at the war council)

An anecdote handed down in the “Jōzan Kidan.” When Sakai Tadatsugu proposed the surprise attack on the Tobigasuyama forts at the joint war council on the night of the 20th of the 5th month, Nobunaga deliberately jeered and rejected it in the public place. This was Nobunaga’s psychological warfare out of fear of leaking information to the Takeda side, and it is said that after the council ended he secretly summoned Tadatsugu and ordered the operation carried out. It is widely known as an episode showing Nobunaga’s strategic vision and the marvel of his psychological warfare. However, the “Jōzan Kidan” is an Edo-period anecdote collection, and its historicity needs examination.

— Yuasa Jōzan, “Jōzan Kidan”

“A peerless bowman of Japan.”

(Nobunaga’s appraisal of Takeda Katsuyori)

Nobunaga’s appraisal, let slip on learning of the death of Takeda Katsuyori when he took his own life at Tenmokuzan (1582). “Bowman” means a warrior. It is recorded in the “Mikawa Monogatari” that Nobunaga appraised Katsuyori—”a peerless bowman of Japan; when his fortune runs out, it comes to this.” Though Nobunaga won a great victory over Katsuyori at Nagashino, it can be seen that he highly valued Katsuyori’s own ability as a warrior. The greatest enemy of the time acknowledges that one should not brand Katsuyori a “mediocre daimyō” by the image of the defeat at Nagashino alone.

— Ōkubo Tadataka, “Mikawa Monogatari”

Anecdotes and Episodes of the Battle of Nagashino

Torii Suneemon’s Escape — Breaking Through the Encirclement by Diving the River

The course of Torii Suneemon’s escape from Nagashino Castle is among the foremost dramas even of the Sengoku period. Late on the night of the 14th of the 5th month, Suneemon plunged from the castle’s drainage outlet into the Kansa River. The Takeda army’s watch net had an alarm net set in the river, a contrivance that, if a person passed, would sound and be noticed.

Finding the alarm net, Suneemon had no choice but to cut the net underwater and go on. A Takeda soldier noticed that the alarm net had been cut and raised his voice, but because another soldier said “it must be the work of a sea bass” and did not try to investigate, Suneemon was able to break through the encirclement safely (Kaneko Hiraku, “Torii Suneemon,” and others).

Suneemon came ashore around Hirose, put on his clothes, and hurried to Kanbō Pass (Gampōzan). Reaching the pass, he raised a single column of signal smoke as the prearranged signal of “successful escape” agreed with the senior retainers within the castle. The castle troops, finding Suneemon’s signal smoke in the southern sky from Nagashino Castle, are said to have rejoiced greatly.

Okudaira Sadamasa’s Defense of Nagashino Castle with 500 Troops

Against the Takeda army of 15,000, the defending troops of Nagashino Castle were only 500. Ordinarily it ought not to have held for even 10 days. But Okudaira Sadamasa, skillfully operating 200 guns and making use of the advantage of the terrain, continued to weather the Takeda army’s fierce assault.

The Takeda army’s guns too fiercely attacked Nagashino Castle, and the castle is said to have become full of bullet holes. Even so, Sadamasa controlled his 500 troops and held it to the end. Even when the provision storehouse was lost to fire and it was on the verge of falling, the timing of Suneemon’s request for relief and the arrival of the reinforcements coincided miraculously, and the castle could be held.

After the Battle of Nagashino, Sadamasa received a character from Nobunaga’s name and changed his name to “Nobumasa,” and took Ieyasu’s eldest daughter Kamehime as his principal wife. He was granted the famed sword “Daihannya Nagamitsu” and became, as the Okudaira-Matsudaira house, a distinguished house continuing until the Meiji era. The feat of weathering the Takeda’s 15,000 with 500 troops is handed down as among the foremost siege defenses even of the Sengoku period.

The Heroic End of Baba Nobuharu

Even among the famed Takeda generals who died at the Battle of Nagashino, the end of Baba Nobuharu was heroic. At nearly 70 years of age, he was the most senior veteran general within the Takeda house, having served since Shingen’s time. Amid the allied army’s gun attack at Shitaragahara, Nobuharu took on the rearmost position to aid Katsuyori’s retreat.

Nobuharu turned his horse again and again to cut down the Oda-Tokugawa army, and held his ground on the battlefield until Katsuyori had withdrawn to safety. At the last he was surrounded by the allied army and died in battle. The scene of Nobuharu’s end is depicted in the Nagashino Battle Screen. The figure of the old Takeda general giving his life to protect the life of the young head Katsuyori is handed down as a scene symbolizing the bond of the Takeda retainer band.

Yamagata Masakage’s Red Corps

One of the most feared commanders within the Takeda house, Yamagata Masakage, also died at Nagashino. The “Red Corps” Masakage led was an elite force with its arms unified in vermilion, known as a representative strong force of the Sengoku period.

At the Battle of Nagashino, Yamagata’s unit bore the right wing and attacked the front of the Tokugawa army. It showed a fierce charge that closed on Ieyasu’s headquarters, but was blocked by the horse-barrier palisade, received concentrated gunfire, and Masakage too died in battle. He was 47.

The tradition of Yamagata’s Red Corps was inherited, after the destruction of the Takeda clan, by the “Ii Red Corps” of Ii Naomasa, who was taken into the Tokugawa house. Further, at the Siege of Osaka, the Red Corps of Sanada Nobushige (Yukimura) was active as an elite of the Toyotomi side. Yamagata Masakage’s Red Corps left a long influence on later ages as a symbol of Sengoku-period elites.

The Deaths of the Brothers Sanada Nobutsuna and Masateru

The Sanada house, retainers of the Takeda, also received a great blow at Nagashino. Sanada Nobutsuna, the eldest son of Sanada Yukitaka, and Masateru, the second son, both died in battle. The one left was the third son, Sanada Masayuki, who would later contend with the Tokugawa as lord of Ueda Castle. Furthermore, the history of the Sanada clan, in which Masayuki’s second son Sanada Nobushige (Yukimura) was active at the Siege of Osaka, can be said to have begun with the deaths at Nagashino.

In the Nagashino Battle Screen, the figures of the Sanada brothers are depicted as the firing targets of Maeda Toshiie’s force. Ironically, 39 years after the Battle of Nagashino, at the Winter Siege of Osaka, the force of Maeda Toshiie’s son Toshimitsu (Toshitsune) would receive great damage from the Sanada-maru led by the Sanada brothers’ nephew, Sanada Nobushige. It is a configuration that makes one feel the karmic ties of history.

The False Defection of Sakuma Nobumori — Nobunaga’s Stratagem

By an anecdote handed down in the “Buke Jiki” and “Jōzan Kidan,” the one who drove Katsuyori into decisive battle was the “false defection” of the Oda retainer Sakuma Nobumori. Nobumori promised Katsuyori “I will defect,” and through Katsuyori’s close aide Nagasaka Mitsukata urged the pro-war argument. Katsuyori believed Nobumori’s defection and chose decisive battle, and the result was a great defeat. In fact Nobumori’s defection was Nobunaga’s stratagem—such is the gist of the anecdote.

The truth of this anecdote is not settled, but considering the high level of Nobunaga’s stratagem ability, the possibility that some disruptive information was sent into the Takeda camp is high. Ironically, Nobumori was expelled by Nobunaga five years later, in 1580 (Tenshō 8), for “poor performance.” The false-defection maneuver at Nagashino may have been Nobumori’s greatest feat, but in the end he could not keep Nobunaga’s trust.

The Strange Clear Spell in the Rainy Season

The Battle of Nagashino was fought in the rainy season of the 5th lunar month, but strangely, it is handed down that on this day alone it was clear except near the Takeda army’s headquarters. According to the “Nagashino Diary / Shitara History,” Nobunaga was even called the “rainy-season general” because in important battles it always rained and erased the footsteps of his march, so that it was rare for it to be clear.

This clear weather made possible the activity of the Oda army’s gun units. This is because the matchlock gun becomes difficult to use in rain, as the fire of the match goes out. Conversely, near the Takeda army’s headquarters, because of the mist, they could not correctly grasp the situation and are said to have expanded their losses. It was a strange turn of fortune that should be expressed as even the weather conditions siding with Nobunaga.

The Marriage of Okudaira Sadamasa and Kamehime — A Sengoku Love Story

In the stage before the Battle of Nagashino, Okudaira Sadamasa was promised betrothal with Ieyasu’s eldest daughter Kamehime. At the time, Kamehime was 12. It was a match given to Sadamasa, who had turned coat from the Takeda to the Tokugawa, in return for “defending to the death the key of eastern Mikawa, Nagashino Castle.”

Sadamasa was born in 1555 and was 20 at the time of the Battle of Nagashino. With the betrothal with Kamehime as his support, he endured the siege of the Takeda’s 15,000 with 500 troops. After the Battle of Nagashino, in 1576 (Tenshō 4), Kamehime formally married Sadamasa (Nobumasa). Between the two were born four sons and one daughter, who became the foundation of the prosperity of the Okudaira-Matsudaira house.

Many of the political marriages of the Sengoku period were cold-hearted, but the marriage of Sadamasa and Kamehime is handed down as a comparatively good one. Kamehime lived long even after Nobumasa’s death, dying in 1625 (Kan’ei 2) at the age of 66. It may not quite be called a “Sengoku love story,” but it is an interesting anecdote as a human drama behind the Battle of Nagashino.

Battle of Nagashino Timeline

Date	Event
4th month, 1573	Takeda Shingen dies of illness during the westward campaign. Katsuyori succeeds to the headship.
2nd month, 1574	Katsuyori invades the Oda territory of Mino and brings down 18 castles.
6th month, 1574	Katsuyori takes the impregnable famed castle of Takatenjin Castle in Tōtōmi. The Takeda house reaches its maximum extent.
5th month, 8th day, 1575	Takeda Katsuyori begins the siege of Nagashino Castle with a great army of 15,000.
Late night, 5th month, 14th	Okudaira Sadamasa sends out Torii Suneemon as a secret messenger. He dives the Kansa River and breaks through the encirclement.
Morning, 5th month, 15th	Suneemon raises a signal fire from Gampōzan to convey his successful escape.
Afternoon, 5th month, 15th	Suneemon arrives at Okazaki Castle. Requests reinforcements from Ieyasu and Nobunaga. A total of 38,000 (Nobunaga’s 30,000 + Tokugawa’s 8,000) prepares to set out.
Early morning, 5th month, 16th	Suneemon is captured by the Takeda army right before Nagashino Castle.
5th month, 16th	Suneemon shouts “the reinforcements are coming” at the cross and is run through with spears by the Takeda army. He was 36. The castle troops’ morale is roused.
5th month, 18th	The allied Oda-Tokugawa army of 38,000 arrives at Shitaragahara. Deploys on the west bank of the Rengo River and begins building the fortified camp with a triple palisade, ramparts, and dry moats.
5th month, 19th	Katsuyori moves his army to the midpoint between Shitaragahara and Nagashino. Firms his resolve for decisive battle.
Night, 5th month, 20th	War council. Sakai Tadatsugu’s Tobigasuyama surprise attack is decided (in the “Jōzan Kidan,” rejection → secret order). A detachment of 4,000 under Sakai Tadatsugu sets out.
Around 6 a.m., 5th month, 21st	The main battle at Shitaragahara opens. The Takeda army begins its attack on the allied army.
Around 8 a.m., 5th month, 21st	Sakai Tadatsugu’s detachment surprises the Tobigasuyama forts from the rear. Takeda Nobuzane (Shingen’s half-brother) dies; all five forts fall. Nagashino Castle is relieved; the Takeda army’s retreat route is cut.
Morning–midday, 5th month, 21st	Eight hours of fierce battle at Shitaragahara. The Takeda army charges again and again but is blocked by the fortified camp and suffers grievous losses from gunfire. The clansmen Anayama Nobukimi, Takeda Nobukado, and others begin to withdraw.
Past midday, 5th month, 21st	Katsuyori decides on retreat. The Takeda army flees in defeat with over 10,000 dead. Many veteran generals—Yamagata Masakage, Baba Nobuharu, Naitō Masahide, Tsuchiya Masatsugu, Sanada Nobutsuna, Sanada Masateru—die in battle.
5th month, 22nd onward	The allied army pursues into the Takeda territory. Katsuyori withdraws to Kai.
1576	Okudaira Sadamasa (Nobumasa) marries Ieyasu’s eldest daughter Kamehime.
3rd month, 1582	The destruction of the Takeda clan (the Battle of Tenmokuzan). Seven years after the Battle of Nagashino.

* Dates are in the old (lunar) calendar. Row shading: orange = preparation for the decisive battle; red = the battle and its final settlement; yellow = post-battle developments.

Battle of Nagashino: Relationships of the Key Figures of Both Armies

The Allied Oda-Tokugawa Army

Role	Person	Movements in This Battle
Supreme commander	Oda Nobunaga	Took part leading 30,000 reinforcements. Built the fortified camp at Shitaragahara and smashed the Takeda army. Displayed the comprehensive strategy of guns, sealing the retreat route, and stratagem.
Allied supreme commander	Tokugawa Ieyasu	Took part leading the Tokugawa army of 8,000. Wiped away the humiliation of Mikatagahara. The land of Nagashino was Tokugawa territory.
Lord of Nagashino Castle	Okudaira Sadamasa (Nobumasa)	Repelled the Takeda army of 15,000 with 500 troops and held Nagashino Castle. For the feat, received a character of Nobunaga’s name to become “Nobumasa” and took Ieyasu’s daughter Kamehime.
Loyal retainer	Torii Suneemon	An Okudaira ashigaru. Escaped Nagashino Castle and succeeded in the request for relief, but was captured and crucified. Died shouting “the reinforcements are coming.” He was 36.
Tokugawa Four Heavenly Kings	Sakai Tadatsugu	Foremost of the Tokugawa Four Heavenly Kings. Proposed and carried out the Tobigasuyama surprise attack, the decisive blow that cut the Takeda army’s retreat route. Received the tachi signed “Sanemitsu” (National Treasure) from Nobunaga.
Tokugawa Four Heavenly Kings	Honda Tadakatsu	Fought hard in the defense of Ieyasu’s headquarters and the pursuit at the main battle of Shitaragahara.
Tokugawa Four Heavenly Kings	Sakakibara Yasumasa	Took part as a main force of the Tokugawa army.
Oda retainer	Hashiba Hideyoshi	Took part as a main force of the Oda army.
Oda retainer	Akechi Mitsuhide	Took part as a main force of the Oda army.
Oda retainer	Shibata Katsuie	Took part as a senior retainer of the Oda house.
Oda retainer	Sakuma Nobumori	A senior retainer of the Oda house. There is an anecdote that he played a false-defection maneuver toward Katsuyori.
Oda retainer	Takigawa Kazumasu	Took part as a main force of the Oda army.
Oda retainer	Niwa Nagahide	Took part as a main force of the Oda army.
Oda retainer	Maeda Toshiie	Active as a gun-unit captain of the Oda army. Said to have shot the Sanada brothers Nobutsuna and Masateru.

The Takeda Army

Role	Person	Movements in This Battle
Supreme commander	Takeda Katsuyori	Besieged Nagashino Castle leading 15,000. Chose decisive battle at Shitaragahara and was greatly defeated. Withdrew to Kai. The starting point of the Takeda clan’s decline.
Takeda Four Heavenly Kings	Yamagata Masakage	Led the “Red Corps” and bore the right wing. Died after a fierce fight closing on Ieyasu’s headquarters. He was 47.
Takeda Four Heavenly Kings	Baba Nobuharu	The most senior veteran general of the Takeda house. Took on the rearmost position to aid Katsuyori’s retreat and died after a hard fight.
Takeda Four Heavenly Kings	Naitō Masahide	Bore the left wing. Died at Shitaragahara.
Clansman	Takeda Nobuzane	Shingen’s half-brother. Commander of the Tobigasuyama group of forts. Died in Sakai Tadatsugu’s surprise attack.
Clansman	Anayama Nobukimi (Baisetsu)	A Takeda clansman. Took part as the center force but withdrew on his own, collapsing the Takeda army’s organized offensive.
Clansman	Takeda Nobukado	Shingen’s younger brother, a Takeda clansman. Withdrew together with Anayama Nobukimi.
Takeda retainer	Sanada Nobutsuna	The eldest son of Sanada Yukitaka. Died at Nagashino. As the second son Masateru also died, the Sanada headship passed to the third son, Masayuki.
Takeda retainer	Sanada Masateru	The second son of Sanada Yukitaka. Died at Nagashino.
Takeda retainer	Tsuchiya Masatsugu	A veteran general of the Takeda. Died at Nagashino.
Takeda retainer	Hara Masatane	A veteran general of the Takeda. Died at Nagashino.
Katsuyori’s close aide	Atobe Katsusuke	Katsuyori’s close aide. Insisted on the pro-war argument and conflicted with the senior-retainer layer (the “Kōyō Gunkan”).
Katsuyori’s close aide	Nagasaka Mitsukata	Katsuyori’s close aide. There is an anecdote that he conveyed Sakuma Nobumori’s false-defection information to Katsuyori.

Related Historic Site Map — Battle of Nagashino

Spots on the Map:

• Nagashino Castle ruins (castle) — The home castle of Okudaira Sadamasa, who held off the attack of the Takeda’s 15,000 with 500 troops. The Nagashino Castle Site Historic Preservation Hall is attached.
• Tobigasuyama fort ruins (fort / old battlefield) — The Takeda-side siege fort where Sakai Tadatsugu’s surprise attack became the decisive blow. A stronghold overlooking Nagashino Castle.
• Shitaragahara old battlefield (old battlefield) — The stage of the main battle of the 21st of the 5th month. The triple horse-barrier palisade is reproduced there.
• Shitaragahara History Museum (museum) — Exhibits relics and materials of the Battle of Nagashino, including the Nagashino Battle Screen.
• Grave of Baba Nobuharu (grave) — The most senior veteran general of the Takeda house, who died serving as rear guard to let Katsuyori escape.
• Grave of Yamagata Masakage (grave) — One of the Takeda Four Heavenly Kings, who led the “Red Corps” and died at Shitaragahara.
• Monument to the Crucifixion Death of Torii Suneemon (monument) — A monument in memory of the loyal retainer who died shouting “the reinforcements are coming.”
• Shingen Mound (grave / old battlefield) — A mound enshrining the Takeda dead. The local villagers buried them with care.

* The map is a reference display based on modern roads. It differs from the roads and terrain of the Sengoku period.

📍 View the route on Google Maps (switchable between car/train)

Related Articles

Battle Articles

• Battle of Mikatagahara (1572) — Shingen overwhelms Ieyasu; the battle three years before Nagashino.
• Battle of Takatenjin Castle (1574–) — Katsuyori takes a famed castle even Shingen could not; the success experience of the previous year.
• Battle of Anegawa (1570) — A battle sharing the structural problem of the “great victory myth.”
• The Kanegasaki Retreat (1570) — The battle that became the starting point of the Nobunaga-Ieyasu alliance.
• Battle of Odani Castle (1573) — The battle in which, after Shingen’s death, Nobunaga destroyed the Azai clan.

Warlord Articles

• Oda Nobunaga — The supreme commander, who displayed the comprehensive strategy of fortified camp + guns + sealing the retreat route.
• Tokugawa Ieyasu — The allied supreme commander, who wiped away the humiliation of Mikatagahara.
• Takeda Katsuyori — The young head of the Takeda clan, brought to the starting point of decline by the great defeat at Nagashino.
• Takeda Shingen — Katsuyori’s father, who died of illness two years before Nagashino.
• Honda Tadakatsu — Fought hard at the main battle of Shitaragahara.
• Sakai Tadatsugu — The decisive contributor who proposed and carried out the Tobigasuyama surprise attack.
• Torii Suneemon — The loyal retainer who died by crucifixion shouting “the reinforcements are coming.”
• Sakakibara Yasumasa — One of the Tokugawa Four Heavenly Kings, who fought hard at Shitaragahara.
• Hashiba Hideyoshi — Took part as a main force of the Oda army.
• Akechi Mitsuhide — Took part as part of the Oda army.
• Shibata Katsuie — Took part as a senior retainer of the Oda house.

References

Primary Sources

• Ōta Gyūichi, “Shinchō Kōki” — a contemporary record by a Nobunaga retainer. Conveys the course of the Battle of Nagashino and the number of guns (“about 1,000”).
• “Kōyō Gunkan” — a Takeda-house war chronicle. Conveys the generational conflict within the Takeda house and the background of Katsuyori’s decision.
• Ōkubo Tadataka, “Mikawa Monogatari” — a record by a Tokugawa retainer. Includes Nobunaga’s appraisal of Katsuyori.
• “Tōdaiki” — a contemporary source, the outline of the battle.
• “Suganuma Kafu” — conveys the route of the Tobigasuyama surprise attack.

Secondary Sources (Edo Period Onward)

• Oze Hoan, “Shinchō-ki” (Hoan’s “Shinchō-ki,” compiled 1611) — the oldest source of the “three-rank volley” and “3,000 guns.”
• Yuasa Jōzan, “Jōzan Kidan” — conveys the “rejection → secret order” anecdote of Sakai Tadatsugu’s Tobigasuyama surprise attack.
• “Buke Jiki” — conveys the false defection of Sakuma Nobumori.
• “Revised and Expanded Nagashino Diary (Nagashino Senki)” — a detailed record of the Battle of Nagashino.
• “Nagashino Battle Screens” (8 extant) — Edo-period paintings depicting the scene of the fighting. There is no depiction of a three-rank volley.

Major Research Works and Papers

• Hirayama Yū, “The Japanese History of the Defeated 9: The Battle of Nagashino and Takeda Katsuyori” (Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 2014) — a culmination of Nagashino research, including the “three ranks = three places” theory and an analysis of Katsuyori’s decision.
• Hirayama Yū, “Tokugawa Ieyasu and Takeda Shingen” (KADOKAWA, Kadokawa Sensho 664, 2022).
• Hirayama Yū, “Did the Takeda Cavalry Corps Really Exist?” (“Rekishijin,” September 2017 issue).
• Fujimoto Masayuki, “Nobunaga’s Wars” (Kōdansha Gakujutsu Bunko, 2003) — the argument denying the three-rank volley.
• Fujimoto Masayuki, “On the Number of the Oda Gun Corps at the Battle of Nagashino” (“Kacchū Bugu Kenkyū,” no. 35, 1975) — the 1,500-gun theory.
• Suzuki Masaya, “Guns and the Japanese” (Chikuma Gakugei Bunko, 2000) — a criticism of the three-rank volley and the Takeda cavalry corps.
• Suzuki Masaya, “The Great Misunderstandings of the Sengoku Period” (PHP Institute) — “Cavalry vs. Guns: The Battle of Nagashino.”
• Kaneko Hiraku, “Torii Suneemon” (Heibonsha, 2018) — a biographical history of Torii Suneemon.
• “The Truth of the Nagashino-Shitaragahara Battle” (Yūzankaku, 2008).

Public Papers and Commentary

• Tōyō Keizai Online, “The Great Mysteries Still Remaining in the ‘Battle of Nagashino,’ Where Ieyasu and Nobunaga Won an Overwhelming Victory,” 2023.
• Tōyō Keizai Online, “‘Oda-Tokugawa vs. Takeda’: 90% of the Received View of the Battle of Nagashino Is False,” 2023.
• Rekishi Kaidō, “The Truth of the Battle of Nagashino — Why Did Takeda Katsuyori Repeat Reckless Charges?”
• Gentōsha plus, Hirayama Yū, “The Nagashino Battle on Which the Survival of Ieyasu and Katsuyori Hung” (serialization of “Tokugawa Ieyasu and Takeda Katsuyori”).
• Waraku web, “Torii Suneemon, Full of Humanity, Who May Have Changed the Course of the Nagashino Battle.”

Public Institution Materials

• Nagashino Castle Site Historic Preservation Hall (Shinshiro City, Aichi Prefecture).
• Shitaragahara History Museum (Shinshiro City, Aichi Prefecture) — holds many relics and materials of the Battle of Nagashino.
• Shinshiro City official tourism guide.
• Wakayama Prefectural Museum (holder of a Nagashino Battle Screen).

* This article is composed on the basis of the sources, research works, and papers above, as well as multiple information sources on the web. There are points on which interpretations of history differ even among researchers, and established views may change with the discovery of new sources or the advance of research.